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I. INTRODUCTION
The great changes in world politics over the past decade have
precipitated a vast increase in efforts to promote American legal models in the
provision of assistance to regimes in transition throughout the world. The
euphoria associated with the transitions from communism throughout the
former Soviet Bloc has ushered in, as one scholar notes, "a triumphant
philosophy of history: the conversion of Them into Us (or U.S.), the final
admission that freedom and democracy are to be gained only where the
magical logics of capitalism and modernity are allowed to cast their spell over
time and space."' As a result, as many have noted, much American legal
guidance to transition societies in the past decade has been characterized by
t J.D., Harvard Law School, 2000. This Article benefited enormously from the guidance of
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, Harvard Law School, and Professor Pippa Norris, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, as well as the comments and suggestions of Lawrence Friedman, Ruth Madrigal,
and Frederick Palmer.
1. R.B.J. WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS POLITICAL THEORY 144
(1993). See generally Julie Mertus, Mapping Civil Society Transplants: A Preliminary Comparison of
Eastern Europe and Latin America, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 921, 922-30 (1999) (stating that Western
investors in post-Cold War Eastern Europe act under the assumptions of liberalism and a single form of
knowledge).
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the wholesale exportation of American norms, without adequate consideration
of their context or consequences.2
Despite the depth and diversity of American legal assistance to transition
societies, the American experience is far from the only model being exported.
As one scholar from the region has noted, despite the dominance of American
and British legal experts in the region, the impact of common law countries on
the creation of legislation has been modest? In many cases, given the civil law
tradition of many of the transition states, Roman-Germanic models have
predominated in the codification of post-socialist law.4 Similarly, many of the
transition states have looked to continental models in the creation of new post-
socialist constitutions. As a result, much of the advice proffered by American
experts that pushes for "distinctively U.S.-based solutions" has often been
dismissed as irrelevant to the "overwhelmingly 'civil law' recipients of U.S.
legal aid and assistance."6
These experiences underscore the importance of an appreciation of
context in the application of foreign models to political transition.
7 Within the
American legal community, there has been an increasing awareness of the
exceptionalism of the American experience." This exceptionalism is
particularly pronounced in the domain of free expression. Constitutional
scholar Robert Post has noted that "[no] other country allows such a breadth
of defamatory, indecent, abusive, and outrageous utterances."
9 Though
American jurisprudence has been an influence in the development of free
speech principles throughout the world for decades, few countries have come
close to following the American model to the full extent of its free speech
2. E.g., MONROE PRICE, TELEVISION, THE PUBLIC SPHERE, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 140
(1995); Jacques de Lisle, Lex Americana? United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and
Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L. 179 (1999).
3. Stanislaw Soltysinski, Transfer of Legal Systems as Seen by the "Import Countries": A
View from Warsaw, in SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION IN MITTEL-UND-OSTEUROPA UND IHRE FOLGEN FOR
BANKEN, BORSEN UND KREDITSICHERHEITEN 69, 76 (Ulrich Drobnig et al. eds., 1998); see also de Lisle,
supra note 2, at 183 ("On the whole, the impact of U.S. programs and projects and the influence of U.S.
models have been uneven and relatively modest in their key target areas of the former Soviet Bloc...
.11).
4. Cf. Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern
Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 106-17 (1995) (describing codification and recodification of civil law in
Central and Eastern European countries).
5. Luis L6pez Guerra, The Application of the Spanish Model in the Constitutional
Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 1937, 1945-47 (1998) (discussing the
influence of the post-Franco Spanish constitution on post-socialist Eastern European constitutions).
6. De Lisle, supra note 2, at 273.
7. E.g., J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European Constitutionalism and Its Discontents,
17 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & BUS. 354, 355 (1996-97) ("The dangers of 'borrowing' from one legal system to
another are famous: the law of any polity is a construct embedded in a specific social and political
culture and its transmutation to other polities is not easily achieved.").
8. E.g., Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARv. L. REv. 633, 728-29
(2000) (arguing against the export of an American-style separation of powers, noting:
[I]t is important to recognize that America really is exceptional in its relatively benign
experience with its familiar forms of separation. Despite our present military and cultural
hegemony, we should be very reluctant to hold the American system up as an ideal for
aspiring democracies throughout the world. Yet this is just what seems to be going on .... ).
9. Robert C. Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 473, 483-84
(1997).
[Vol. 26: 179
A Very Clear and Present Danger
libertarianism."0 Particularly within the realm of hate speech, the United States
stands virtually alone in its absolute protection of speech despite the harm it
causes. The choice of free speech models in the case of post-war
democratization in Kosovo brings these problems of context and norm
exportation into sharp relief.
At the close of the year 2000, the former Yugoslav province of Kosovo
stands divided, between Serb and Albanian, radical and moderate, war and
peace. The conflict in the province ended in June 1999 with Kosovo and its
media in ruins. Violence has never truly abated in the province, and early
moves by radical factions on both sides have laid the foundation for a de facto
partition between Serbs and Albanians, policed by the international
community. The Kosovar media, newly freed from repression at the hands of
the Serbian authorities, have been subject to intimidation and attacks from
both sides when they speak out against the violence and atmosphere of
intimidation in the province.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has
accepted the challenge of overseeing media reform in the province as a part of
the transitional United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), toward an
eventual goal of reconciliation and democratization in Kosovo. As they have
articulated their strategies for reform, the OSCE and UNMIK have come
under fire from the American press and American journalist organizations for
stepping in as outsiders to impose standards upon and censor an Albanian
press that had performed adequately before the conflict began.
This Article will examine the charges made by the American press, and
explore more broadly the role the media plays in building post-conflict
democracy, looking in particular at the problem of incitement to violence and
hate speech as challenges to political transition. Part Two will survey the
present situation in Kosovo and describe briefly the OSCE's Department of
Media Affairs in the province, as well as the American critique of its
operations. In response, I examine more closely the relationship between the
press and a successful democracy, and the challenges for building a
responsible press in a post-conflict society. I then briefly describe the
relationship between the government and the media in Yugoslavia and in
Kosovo, and give an overview of current U.N. efforts to deal with the problem
of incitement to violence and hate speech in the province, as well as the
UNMIK regulation on incitement.
Parts Three and Four present two potential models of hate speech
regulation for Kosovo, namely those of Germany and the United States. Part
Three looks to the post-war experience of Germany and the emergence of an
activist model of hate speech regulation in the German Basic Law and in
German case law. First, I review the state of the media during the Weimar
Republic and the Allied reform plan to rebuild the German press in 1945. I
then look at the activist model of hate speech regulation that was developed
from this model, and examine the provisions of the German Basic Law
10. Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First
Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1803, 1834 (1999) (stating that other non-totalitarian nations offer much
less sweeping free speech protections).
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relating to freedom of speech, as well as the legal limitations of this right.
Finally, I survey the German jurisprudence relating to free speech and
incitement, focusing on the limits ascribed upon the freedom of speech by
concerns of equality and the stability of the German democratic order as a
whole.
In Part Four, I examine the American understanding of the intersection
between free speech, equality, and incitement. An examination of the
evolution of American case law and theory on this issue points to a distinction
between the democratic order of which American free speech theory is an
expression and the developing democracies of post-war Germany and other
post-war transitional societies. While the libertarianism of American free
expression theory may be a good fit for the robust democracy of the modem
United States, it may be a wholly inadequate model for the more fragile
democratic orders of post-conflict democracies. I will argue that the German
model, which places the equality and equal dignity of citizens at the center of
the ordering of constitutional rights, is a more appropriate model on which to
formulate media policy in Kosovo, a region in which the scars of verbal and
tangible atrocity have not yet healed over. In Part Five, I argue that the values
represented by a statute prohibiting media incitement of violence against
minorities may be a necessary step in the process of post-conflict transition,
where the media can serve as a defense or, alternatively, as a threat to
reconciliation and democracy building. Finally, in Part Six, I return to
UNMIK's incitement regulation and examine enforcement issues and the role
the regulation can play in post-war Kosovo.
II. POST-WAR MEDIA REFORM IN Kosovo
Upon the conclusion of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in June 1999,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) agreed to the deployment of an
international security force (KFOR) commanded by NATO and under the
auspices of the United Nations." The NATO force and the United Nations
have effectively controlled Kosovo since June 1999, though the province
officially remains part of the FRY." The province remains in ruins after the
11. Steven Lee Myers & Craig R. Whitney, Peacekeeping Force of 50,000 Allied Troops to
Enter Kosovo as Yugoslav Forces Withdraw, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1999, at A21.
12. The question of the political future of Kosovo remains very much in question at the
moment. U.N. Resolution 1244 states that the international forces in Kosovo are to establish "substantial
autonomy" for Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th
Sess., 401 1th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999). However, the member states involved in UNMIK
have different conceptions of the character and goals of the mission. While some advocate independence
for the province, others support continued Yugoslav sovereignty over the province. This fundamental
lack of consensus has caused great complications as the United Nations has sought to create a workable
administration for the province. See Shkelzen Maliqi, The Institute for War and Peace Reporting,
Special Report: Chaos and Complexities in Kouchner's Kosovo, at http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl5?
balkans index.html (Jan. 14, 2000). Bernard Kouchner, the director of the United Nations
administration in Kosovo, has stated that the "substantial autonomy" referred to in Resolution 1244 "has
never been adequately defined." Barbara Crossette, U.N. Council Urged to Debate Political Future of
Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2000, at A6; see also Fabian Schmidt, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
What Future for Kosova's Shadow State?, at http://www.rferl.orgfbalkan-report/2000/02/10-040
2 0 0 .
html (Feb. 2, 2000). The question of the future status of Kosovo remains far from resolved. Despite the
victory of Serbian opposition candidate Vojislav Koltunica in presidential elections held on September
24, the Kosovar Albanian press and officials have reiterated their aspirations for independence. On
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conflict." For a period shortly after the end of the NATO airstrikes, the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) quickly consolidated its control over large
sections of the province, seizing businesses and homes and creating a
framework for self-government quite different in character from that of the
agreed-upon interim administration.'4 Violence has never truly abated in the
province; a recent statement by nearly eighty international non-governmental
organizations operating in Kosovo reports that inter-ethnic harassment,
intimidation, bombings, arson, drive-by shootings, kidnappings and murder all
continue, despite the province's status as an international protectorate for
more than a year. 5 Widespread violence against Serbs since last June "has
forced an estimated 200,000 Serbs to flee their homes either to Serbia or to
enclaves heavily guarded by KFOR troops."'6 In an atmosphere of increased
violence and with an acknowledged lack of law and order in the province,
Kosovo remains a region in de facto partition more than a year after the end of
hostilities.' 7 Most of the Serbian minority that remains in Kosovo have settled
in the north of the province, and international forces have remained in divided
cities like Kosovska Mitrovica to keep the factions separated. 8 Journalists in
the province who have spoken out against the attacks and atmosphere of
intimidation in the province have been subject to fierce denunciations in the
October 29, Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, or LDK, which won the
municipal elections held in Kosovo that day, called for independence for the province as he claimed
victory in the election. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Rugova's Moderate Party Declared Winner of
Vote in Kosova, at http:lwwv.rferl.orglnewsline/2000/10/301000.html (Oct. 31, 2000). The Prigtina
daily ZERI has stated "that Serbs, including the so-called opposition led by Kottunica, have not only lost
the right to govern Kosovo, but also to talk about Kosovo, emphasizing that Serbia has finished her
mission in Kosovo and only Albanians and the European Union have the right to discuss Kosovo's
fiture status." Free B-92 News, Albanian Press Panics about Koftunica's Influence, at http://news.
freeb92.net (Oct. 1, 2000). The United States and the United Nations have made clear that regardless of
the future status of Kosovo, they want the province to remain multi-ethnic. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger,
Fears Grow Over the De Facto Partition of Kosovo, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1999, at Al. Most recently,
U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen has stated that while the United States will insist on the
broadening of Kosovo's autonomy, it is against full independence for the province. Free B-92 News,
US. For Autonomous Kosovo Within Yugoslavia, at http.//news.freeb92.net (Oct. 9, 2000).
13. International Crisis Group, Starting from Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon Is Over, at
http://wwv.intl-crisis-group.org (Dec. 10, 1999).
14. Chris Hedges, As U.N. Organizes, Rebels Are Taking Charge of Kosovo, N.Y. TMES, July
26, 1999, at Al.
15. Free B-92 News, NGOs Call for an End to Violence in Kosovo, at http://news.freeb92.net
(Sept. 8, 2000).
16. Llazar Semini, The Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Koltunica Keeps Kosovars
Guessing, at http:/Avwwv.iwpr.net/index.pl5?balkansindex.html (Oct. 17, 2000). Daan Everts, Head of
the OSCE Mission to Kosovo, has stated that of the 50,000 Serbs living in Prigtina before the war, only
400 or 500 remain, and that those Serbs remaining in Prigtina "live in isolation, in house detention, their
movement is restricted and they depend on humanitarian aid." Biserka Mati6, Alternative Information
Network, Serbs Between Three Fires, at http:/lwwwv.aimpress.orgldyn/traelarchiveldata199911/91113
002-trae-pod.htm (Nov. 13, 1999); see also Petar Jekni6, The Institute for War and Peace Reporting,
Serbs' Priftina Misery, at http:/Avwwv.iwpr.nettindex.pl5?balkans-index.html (May 5, 2000). For a more
in-depth look at the present status of minorities in Kosovo, see OSCE, Situation of Ethnic Minorities in
Kosovo, at http:llwwv.osce.orglkosovo/publicationslethnicminoritieslindex.htm (Oct. 12, 1999), and
The Delicate Balkan Balance, THE ECONoMisT, Aug. 19, 2000, at 41-43.
17. Steven Erlanger, Indecision Feeds the Dogs of War, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, § 4, at 5.
18. International Crisis Group, Starting from Scratch in Kosovo, supra note 14; see also
International Crisis Group, Kosovo s Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica, at http://www.intl-
crisis-group.org (May 31, 2000) (describing the separation of Mitrovica into a Serbian and an Albanian
section as well as continuing efforts by the United Nations and KFOR to encourage peaceful co-
existance between the two sections).
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press,"0 and the editor of one Albanian language daily has expressed concern
that "each day it is becoming more dangerous to think and speak
independently.
2
A. The OSCE's Mission in Kosovo
The OSCE was established in 1975 when thirty-five European and North
American states signed a declaration called the Helsinki Final Act, which
established the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).21
From the beginning, the CSCE included human rights and fundamental
freedoms within its mandate, a commitment which would carve out a special
role for the CSCE in the increasingly complex politics of post-Cold War
Europe. Given these new political realities, beginning in 1992, the CSCE
began to explore alternatives to the traditional role of international
organizations in the mediation and resolution of conflicts. In 1994, the CSCE
became the OSCE, and redefined its identity as "a primary instrument for
early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management in the region. 22 As
part of its newly articulated assignment, the OSCE developed various
mechanisms for more effective conflict management, including the Long-
Term Mission.23 The Long-Term Missions were developed as an in-country
means of mediation between factions on the ground and gathering information
on potential conflicts within the purview of the OSCE.2 There is no uniform
pattern for defining the mandates of the Missions, though Diana Chigas notes
that although the conditions within which the Missions operate differ
significantly, their purposes are largely the same-to deescalate tensions and
keep the conflict tractable in order to permit negotiations to take place.25 In a
post-conflict situation, the OSCE tends to harmonize its missions with those
of the United Nations. In fact, the OSCE considers itself a regional
organization under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.26 Following the
19. Anthony Borden, The Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Hate Speech in Priltina: The
Kosovo Media Wars Could Start Here, at http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl5?balkansindex.html (Oct. 10,
1999). For a further discussion of this and other incidents, see infra Section II.C.
20. Hedges, supra note 14, at Al.
21. For an informative look at the evolution and institutions of the OSCE, see Diana Chigas,
Preventive Diplomacy and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Creating
Incentives for Dialogue and Cooperation, in PREVENTING CONFLICT IN THE POST-COMMUNIST WORLD:
MOBILIZING INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 25, 25-83 (Abram Chayes & Antonia
Handler Chayes eds., 1996).
22. Id. at 37 (quoting OSCE Summit Declaration, Toward a Genuine Partnership in a New
Era, para. 8 (1994), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 693, 695).
23. Allan Rosas & Timo Lahelma, OSCE Long-Term Missions, in THE OSCE IN THE
MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY: CONFLICT PREVENTION, CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND THE
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 167, 167-90 (Michael Bothe et al. eds., 1997).
24. Chigas, supra note 21, at 56. The OSCE is currently administering eight Long-Term
Missions-in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kosovo, Latvia, Moldova, and
Tajikistan-as well as a Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, Macedonia. For information on the
Missions, see OSCE, Survey of OSCE Long-Term Missions and Other OSCE Field Activities, at http://
www.osce.org/publications/survey/index.htm (Jan. 17,2000).
25. Chigas, supra note 21, at 56.
26. Gian Luca Burci, Division of Labour Between the U.N. and the OSCE, in THE OSCE IN
THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY, supra note 23, at 294. Under Article 52 of the United
Nations Charter, "nothing... precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing
with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for
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war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the OSCE there was granted a lead role in
various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction. According to the terms of the
Dayton Agreement, the OSCE is responsible for overseeing elections,
protecting human rights, and advancing regional stabilization through
confidence-building and security-building measures and arms control.27 As
part of its election duties, the OSCE has been responsible for overseeing
freedom of expression and of the press. 28 As part of this mandate, the OSCE
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina drafted a Code of Conduct of standards
for the Bosnian media and created a Media Experts Commission to monitor
Bosnian journalists' compliance with the Code.
Upon the conclusion of hostilities in Kosovo, the Security Council once
again summoned the OSCE to take part in post-conflict reconstruction in the
former Yugoslavia. On June 10, 1999, the Security Council authorized
Secretary-General Kofi Annan to establish an international civil presence in
Kosovo that would provide an interim administration for the province whose
task it would be to establish and oversee the development of provisional self-
governing institutions." On July 1, 1999, the OSCE, responding to a request
from the Secretary-General, agreed to create a Long-Term Mission in Kosovo
that would take the lead role in matters relating to democratization and
governance, including the development of civil society and an independent
local media.3' As part of its mission, the OSCE established a Department of
Media Affairs in August 1999. The OSCE charged the Department with
responsibility for media regulation, support for independent media, media
monitoring, and the development of media standards.32 The Department of
Media Affairs would allocate frequencies and issue broadcast licenses for
Kosovo. In addition, the OSCE also proposed the creation of a Media
Regulatory Commission to govern broadcasting in the province and to
administer temporary codes for broadcasters and journalists.33 The Department
regional action, provided that such arrangements... are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of
the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER arL 52, para 1.
27. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 50th Sess., Agenda
Item 28, U.N. Doc. S/1995/999 (Dec. 14, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 89 [hereinafter Dayton
Agreement], Annexes IB, 3, 6. For a review of the OSCE's operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see
Mario Sica, The Role of the OSCE in the Former Yugoslavia After the Dayton Agreement, in THE OSCE
IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY, supra note 23, at 479-93.
28. Dayton Agreement, supra note 27, Annex 3.
29. International Crisis Group, Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina: How International Support
Can Be More Effective, at http://vww.intl-crisis-group.org (Mar. 18, 1997).
30. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 12.
31. Decision No. 305 of the OSCE Permanent Council, PC Journal No. 237, Agenda Item 2,
July 1, 1999, available at http:lvww.osee.orglkosovolref.docsPCED305.pdf (last visited December 1,
2000). Under the resolution, the OSCE would become one component of the overall administration of
the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). See OSCE, The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, at http:ll
www.osce.org/publications/survey/surveyl O.html (Jan. 17, 2000).
32. OSCE, OSCE Mission in Kosovo-Media Affairs-Concept of Operations, at http://www.
osce.org/kosovo/media/concept.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2000) [hereinafter OSCE Media Affairs Concept
of Operations].
33. Steven Erlanger, NATO Peacekeepers Plan a System of Controls for the News Media in
Kosovo, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 1999, at A8. OSCE spokesperson Urdur Gunnarsdottir stated in an
August interview with Radio Free Europe:
[W]e supervise what goes on the air. It is very important-especially in the beginning-
that we don't air anything that may enrage or infuriate others.... We will be allocating
frequencies. And I believe that if we have for instance a radio station that breaches over
2001]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
of Media Affairs would also have a Media Monitoring Division, which would
provide content analysis of broadcasting, including election-related media
activities.34 The Department would be advised by a Media Policy Board of
local journalists and other members of Kosovar civil society, both Serb and
Albanian.3 5 The decisions of the Department would also be subject to appellate
review by a body to be appointed by the United Nations.
36
B. The American Critique
The reaction of the American press and American journalism
organizations to the proposed Department of Media Affairs was swift and
critical.37 The New York Times inveighed against the Department in its
editorial page on August 30, arguing that "independent reporters [in Kosovo]
can use European support, including training and financing. But they do not
need ... another group of outsiders to tell them what they can and cannot
say. '38 The New York Times and U.S. media watchdog groups insist that the
answer to hate speech in Kosovo and elsewhere is not to ban it, but to assure
access to alternate views. Representatives of the World Press Freedom
Committee have argued that under the proposed OSCE plan, foreigners would
be imposing their standards on independent journalists, although before the
war there was a "perfectly adequate independent Albanian-language press that
knew what it was all about. '39 The Committee to Protect Journalists and other
free speech advocates have registered their concern that the Department was
setting a precedent that might justify censorship "long after the fighting is
over" in Kosovo and elsewhere.4"
C. An Adequate, Independent Press?
The OSCE has stated that its goal in creating the Department of Media
Affairs is to promote reconciliation, democratization, and law and order in
Kosovo.4' This section explores the relationship between responsible media
and over again all codes of conduct and transmits or broadcasts vicious propaganda or are
trying to inflict public disorder, there will be penalties and they will probably lose their
license.
Lawrence Holland, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Rebirth of Kosovo Neivs Media Requires Support,
at http:/lwww.rferl.orglncalfeatures/1999/08/f.ru.990802125443.html (Aug. 2, 1999).
34. OSCE Media Affairs Concept of Operations, supra note 32.
35. Id. The Board members named by the OSCE were Mahmut Bakalli, a former Communist
leader of Kosovo, Pajazit Nushi, a former head of the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and
Freedoms in Kosovo, Lirie Osmani, an attorney, Shkelzen Maliqi of the Open Society Foundation, and
Aca Rakodevid, a Serb representative. See Garentina Kraja, The Institute for War and Peace Reporting,
Kosovo Journalists' Deep Suspicion of OSCE Media Controls, at http://www.ivpr.net/index.pl5?
balkansindex.html (Sept. 6, 1999).
36. Erlanger, supra note 33.
37. European press organizations, perhaps more accustomed to a higher level of press
regulation, have not opposed the OSCE initiative. Frank Smyth, The Committee to Protect Journalists,
Kosovo: Civility by Decree, at http:/wwv.cpj.orgfdangerous/kosovo/2lntro.html (Sept. 18, 1999).
38. Kosovo's Incipient Media Ministry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1999, at A18.
39. Erlanger, supra note 33.
40. International Journalists' Network, OSCE Media Policy Body in Kosovo Generates
Debate, at http://www.ijnet.orglArchivel1999/9/30-6074.html (Sept. 30, 1999).
41. See Ambassador Daan Everts, Speech Addressing the Opening of Radio Television
Kosovo, Prigtina, Kosovo (Feb. 16, 2000), at http://wwv.osce.org/kosovo/hom/speeches/homspeechl_
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and a successful democracy, as well as the challenges for developing the
media in a society still in transition to post-conflict democratization. Political
scientist Pippa Norris expounds on the relation between media and democracy
in her book A Virtuous Circle.42 Dr. Norris, drawing on the work of political
scientists Joseph Schumpeter and Robert Dahl, notes three structural
characteristics of representative democracy: competition among individuals
and groups for all parts of government; a highly inclusive level of political
participation in the selection of leaders and policies through free, fair, and
periodic elections; and the freedom of expression, press, and assembly. 3 On
the basis of these attributes, Norris identifies three roles for the press in
fostering these goals. In the area of competition, the press may act as a civic
forum, providing both the government and the governed with the opportunity
to communicate effectively with each other." Norris notes that as a civic
forum, the news media should reflect fairly and impartially both the political
and cultural diversity within each society." In the area of participation, the
media may act as a mobilizing agent, encouraging learning about politics and
public affairs so that citizens can cast ballots in an informed manner.46 In the
area of civil and political liberties, the media may act as a watchdog,
scrutinizing those in power to hold officials accountable for their actions and
protecting against abuses of power.47
The question remains how an evolving democratic society may develop
such a press. There is a striking paucity of scholarship on the role of the media
in democratization." However, arguments from social and political theory
may provide the basis for an assessment of the role of the media in post-
conflict development and democratic reform.
Media scholars have long argued that the press plays a role in
constructing reality for its audience.4 9 The media create common experiences,
offer shared symbols and give the public a sense of contact with its leaders,
offering a constant reminder of national identity. Within the context of the
mediapolicy.htm.
42. PIPPA NORRIS, A VIRTUOUS CIRCLE (forthcoming Fall 2000) (manuscript, ch. 2, on file
with The Yale Journal of International Law).
43. Id. at 1.
44. Id. at 3.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 6.
47. ld. at 5. This model draws on the social responsibility model of the press, first discussed in
the 1947 Hutchins Commission report on the goals of journalism entitled The Social Responsibility
Theory of the Press, widely thought to be the most influential American account of the goals of media
performance. The report identifies six tasks as essential to the press's political role in a democracy,
including "servicing the political system by providing information,... enlightening the public," so that
it is "capable of self-government.... and serving as a watchdog on government." Theodore Peterson,
The Social Responsibility Theory of the Press, in FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS: THE AUTHORITARIAN,
LIBERTARIAN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SOVIET COMMUNIST CONCEPTS OF WHAT THE PRESS
SHOULD BE AND Do 73, 74 (Fred S. Siebert et al. eds., 1956). [hereinafter FOUR THEORIES OF THE
PRESS]; see also C. Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 348-49 (1998)
(discussing the Hutchins Commission report).
48. E.g., Patrick H. O'Neil, Democratization and Mass Communication: What Is the Link?, in
COMMUNICATING DEMOCRACY: THE MEDIA AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS 1, 1-7 (Patrick H. O'Neil ed.,
1998).
49. E.g., GADI WOLFSFELD, MEDIA AND POLITICAL CONFLICT: NEWS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST
32 (1997) (discussing social construction of reality theory).
50. Leo Bogart, Media and Democracy, 10 MEDIA STUD. J., Summer 1995, at 1, 8.
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nation-state, these media images weave shared narrative and provide
legitimacy to regimes.
It may be argued that this national fervor can be critical to democratic
development. The political philosopher Ghia Nodia notes that democracy has
always emerged in distinct communities. As such, there must be some method
of defining the demos."1 Nodia argues that unlike the classical city-state,
modem democratic polities are much larger and thus require "citizens to
develop a sense of community... based less on their unaided senses and more
on the human mind or imagination. '52 This concept is related to the thinking of
Benedict Anderson, who has posited that the possibility of nationalist thinking
was precipitated by the advent of commercial printing, which laid the basis for
national consciousness through the consolidation of dialects into languages,
thereby creating a newfound mutual comprehension." It is with this language
that the foundation for the creation of a shared history is laid, and thus the
consciousness crucial to social development as a unified polity is created.
Constitutional scholar Lawrence Lessig argues, however, that what he
terms a "construction of tradition" can occur in two ways-a positive
construction, which proceeds not by silencing but by emphasizing selected
interpretations of history, and a more negative construction, an
"institutionalized practice of forgetting," in which alternative historical
interpretations are destroyed. 4 This is precisely the problem of post-conflict
societies like Kosovo, where a multi-ethnic post-war society must choose
between historical renderings. As Monroe Price, a noted author on the subject
of law and media, observes:
National identity can easily become a camouflage for a series of controls that occupy the
creative space and deny the opportunity for a pluralism of views and freedom of
expression. National identity is too often flaunted as a means not of positive expression,
but of criticism and the stifling of ideas, used to 'divert people from paying attention to
malfumctioning social orders'.
55
Thus, the conflict over identity may operate to disable the press as a
democratic actor in the post-conflict context. In a post-conflict context, the
media, instead of fostering a balance of views that may limit the spread of
hatred, may reflect the prejudices of the regime, 56 and become a source not for
information, but for incitement and encouragement.5 7 This was illustrated in
tragic detail during the genocide in Rwanda.58 Given this degree of control
51. Ghia Nodia, Nationalism and Democracy, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 1992, at 3, 6.
52. Id. at 8.
53. BENEDICTANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIEs 36,44 (2d ed. 1991).
54. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 978 (1995).
55. PRICE, supra note 2, at 41.
56. WOLFSFELD, supra note 49, at 43 (noting that "journalists... often adopt the language,
customs, and perspective of the host culture").
57. As Warren Zimmermann, ex-U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia notes, the media in this
situation will not provide information, but "emotional reassurance" resulting in a situation in which
viewers may "take righteous satisfaction in discharging their anger at their neighbors." WARREN
ZIMMERMANN, ORIGINS OF A CATASTROPHE: YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS DESTROYERS-AMERICA'S LAST
AMBASSADOR TELLS WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY 121 (1996).
58. See Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of Radio
Jamming, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 630-31 (1997). The broadcasts of Hutu-founded Radio-T6l6vision
Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) would "identify and criticize an individual, and Interahamwe groups
[Vol. 26: 179
A Very Clear and Present Danger
and coordination, the victors' interpretation of events is the only narrative
reported in the media, thereby depriving the public of the diversity of
information necessary to make decisions in a competitive political process. As
the social theorist Anthony Giddens has noted:
[T]he discourse of national solidarity helps block off other possible discursive
articulations of interest. The discursive arena of the modem polity treats what 'politics' is
as inherently to do with the bounded sphere of the state. Thus if programmes of reform
on the part of subordinate classes (or other groupings) are to succeed, they have normally
to be made to appear in 'the national interest'. But dominant classes have much less
difficulty representing their own policies as in the 'national interest' than do oppositional
groups, since they have more influence over the style and form of what can be
discursively articulated.
5 9
Finally, it will be difficult for an ethnically biased and dominated media
to act as a watchdog against a government whose stated purpose is to
vindicate the ethno-national identity of the group it represents. As the political
scientist Gadi Wolfsfeld has observed, the level of political control exerted
over the news media is likely to vary in times of crisis. When there is a
perceived crisis:
[l]t becomes much easier for the authorities to use emergency orders and the like to
impose a greater level of control on the news media. Not only is the public more likely to
favor such controls, but the press itself may prefer a certain amount of censorship to
protect itself from charges that suggest that coverage is either "risking lives" or"~unpatriotic.' ' 60
A brief history of the media environment in Yugoslavia, and in Kosovo,
throws these dilemmas into sharp relief. As I intend to show, the Yugoslav
media, and the Kosovar media in particular, have never had the opportunity to
develop into a civic forum, a source of impartial information, or a guardian of
individual rights-roles which, as I have explained above, can prove crucial in
the creation of a democratic polity in the wake of civil unrest and war.
During the Cold War, the Yugoslavs, under Tito, had the greatest access
to the largest variety of mass media among the countries of Eastern Europe.6
Article 166 of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution guaranteed freedom of the
press, freedom of expression, and freedom of association, yet this was subject
to a criminal prohibition under Article 133 of the Federal Criminal Code on
publication of information which could advocate or incite the overthrow of the
power of the working class, change the system of self-management, disrupt
the brotherhood, unity and equality of nationalities, or the security and
defense of the country. 62 The violation of this article was subject to a term of
imprisonment of up to ten years. 3 In addition to this legal limitation on
journalistic autonomy, the more free media of Yugoslavia did not view
would set out at once to find and attack the person named." Id. at 631.
59. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE NATION-STATE AND VIOLENCE: VOLUME Two OF A
CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUE OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 221 (1985).
60. WOLFSFELD, supra note 49, at 60-61.
61. GERTRUDE ROBINSON, TITO'S MAVERICK MEDIA: THE POLITICS OF MASS
COMMUNICATIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA 213 (1977).
62. MARK THOMPSON, FORGING NVAR: THE MEDIA IN SERBIA, CROATIA, BOSNIA AND
HERCEGOVINA 9-10 (1999).
63. Id. at 10.
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themselves as a real source for independent opinion. According to Gertrude
Robinson, the author of a study of the Yugoslav media during the Tito regime,
journalists in Tito's Yugoslavia saw themselves as "rightful custodians of
public knowledge, rather than as facilitators of public debate."'
The importance of the news media as monopolists in the market for
public information was seized upon by the Communist elites in the late 1980s
as a means of maintaining power in an environment of increasing reform,
most notably by Slobodan Milogevic. According to ARTICLE 19,65 the issue
of Kosovo, a largely Albanian province within Serbia, was used to "suppress
alternative political approaches by exploiting the supreme mobilizing potential
of the Kosovo myth: the myth of a martyred people unified around a sacred
cause of unquestionable justice."66 Within the Serbian media, there has been
widespread recourse to hateful propaganda, including portrayals of ethnic
Albanians as "sub-human and congenitally bent on violence."'67 As early as
1987, Serbian papers were publishing stories about the Serbian minority in
Kosovo allegedly protecting themselves from Albanian terrorism." Once
violence in the province escalated, the misinformation accelerated as well;
after the massacre of forty-five civilians in Ra~ak in January 1999, Serbian
state media carried the remarks of Serbian Radical Party head Vojislav Segelj,
who claimed that the corpses and bodies of children that had been found were
64. ROBINSON, supra note 61, at 230.
65. ARTICLE 19, the International Centre Against Censorship, is a non-governmental
organization located in London dedicated to freedom of expression worldwide. It takes its name from
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which declares rights to freedom of opinion
and expression. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948).
66. THOMPSON, supra note 62, at 114-15. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in
Serbia noted at the time:
Day after day, the most powerful media in Serbia, especially RTS [Radio Television
Serbia], articulate a non-existent collective stance by all parts of society towards
resolving the current crisis, and represent the political leadership as the most serious and
competent segment [of the collective]. Access to information programmes is granted only
to politicians who accept this framework; the others are simply excluded.... In this way,
not only are other ways of thinking [about Kosovo] eliminated, the mere conception of a
political alternative is eliminated. State and national interests are counterposed to every
individual and group interest, so that [for example] the independent trade union leader,
Tomislav Banovid, told the educational workers that the eve of the Rambouillet
conference [held in 1999 on the future status of Kosovo] wasn't the right moment to go
on strike, because the Kosovo problem was the most important problem facing society
and all of society's resources had to be engaged in resolving it.
Id. at 115. Opinion polls conducted during the Bosnian war in 1992 have indicated the success of the
nationalist stranglehold on the media in manipulating public opinion. Some 1,380 respondents were
asked who had bombarded Sarajevo from the hills surrounding the city in May and June of that year,
38.4% answered Muslim-Croat forces, 22.5% admitted they did not know, and only 20.5% thought that
Serb forces were responsible. Id. at 108.
67. International Crisis Group, Fear and Loathing in Belgrade: What the Serbian State Media
Say About Kosovars, at http:/www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/sbalkans/reports/yugobrf0l.htm (Jan.
26, 1999) [hereinafter Fear and Loathing in Belgrade].
68. Ursula Owen, The Speech That Kills, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, at http:llwwvw.
indexoncensorship.org/issuel98/hate-speech.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2000). Owen recounts the
publication of an article entitled The Mother from Prekale, which contained a photograph of a woman
working in a field with a gun strapped to her shoulder. Within the article, it was claimed that she needed
the gun to protect herself and her children from Albanian terrorists, who were torturing, raping, and
killing Serbs. A few years later it was revealed that the photograph was a fake, set up by the reporter
who had supplied the gun. Id.
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"part of a conspiracy and thrown into the field of battle by the KLA to
discredit Serbia. '"69
The press in Kosovo were subject to even tighter restrictions. The
audiovisual media operating within the province had until recently been
completely controlled from Belgrade. In July 1990, the Serbian Assembly
established special police measures in Kosovo and took over Radio Television
Prigtina (RTP) and various other radio stations in the area, firing the ethnic
Albanian staff and ending Albanian programming on the stations." Since
1990, RTP had been a mouthpiece for the Socialist Party of Serbia and was
often used as a pulpit from which to attack the opposition.71 The staff of the
only Albanian-language daily in the province, Rilindja, were dismissed in
1990, and its offices were locked under "emergency measures" by the Serbian
authorities.72 Following the crackdown, readers of Albanian-language
publications could also be imprisoned for possession of material deemed
hostile to Yugoslavia or Serbia.'
More broadly, up until the end of the recent crisis, the media in
Yugoslavia as a whole were subject to a draconian Serbian Law on Public
Information. The law required publishers to forward copies of each new issue
to the public prosecutor and the Ministry of Information. 74 The law also
imposed penalties of up to U.S. $120,000 for publishing news judged to
promote the forcible overthrow of the constitutional order or jeopardize the
territorial integrity and independence of Serbia and Yugoslavia.7 1 This
provided the basis for a number of actions against the independent media; in
the first year of the law's existence, thirty separate charges were filed,
resulting in U.S. $1.6 million in fines levied against the opposition media.76 In
addition to the Information Law, after the beginning of the armed conflict in
Kosovo in February 1998, the Yugoslav government placed restrictions on the
work of foreign and domestic journalists. Albanian-language media that had
been operating in the province were closed, and Kosovar Albanian journalists
were harassed, beaten, and murdered.
77
By the end of the conflict in Kosovo, the transmission equipment in the
province, as well as the offices of various independent newspapers, had been
69. Fear and Loathing in Belgrade, supra note 67.
70. Press Now, Media in Kosovo, at http://www.dds.nl/-pressnow/media/kosovo/kosovo.htm
(last visited Nov. 22, 2000).
71. Id. The OSCE has taken over administration of RTP (now called Radio Television
Kosovo, or RTK), and resumed broadcasting in Albanian on September 19, 1999. Radio Pristina
Returns to the Airwaves, OSCE NEWSLETTER (OSCE, Vienna, Austria), Aug. 1999, at 5, at http://www.
osce.org/publications/newsletter/nl-99-08/nl0899e.pdf; OSCE, Radio Television Kosovo (RTK), at http:ll
wwwv.osce.org/kosovo/media/rtkfactsheet.htm (Nov. 1999).
72. Ursula Ruston, Kosovo: Where Journalism Is a Crime, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Feb. 1992,
at 18, 19-20.
73. Id. at 20.
74. International Journalists' Network, Media in Yugoslavia, at http://vww.ijnet.org/Profile/
CEENIS/Yugoslavia/media.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2000).
75. THOMPSON, supra note 62, at 117. Fines assessed must be paid within twenty-four hours
and cannot be paid through sales revenue; instead, assets are seized. Id.
76. The Committee to Protect Journalists, Letter to Goran Matid, Minister of Information of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at http:/Avww.cpj.org/protests/991trsfYugolOnov99.html (Nov. 10,
1999).
77. THOMPSON, supra note 62, at 116.
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destroyed.78 In addition, it appeared that the growth of an independent
journalist class would also prove to be an uphill battle. Reports have cited a
lack of professionalism as well as political pressure,79 and reports in the
Albanian press before the conflict castigated Albanian-language dailies for
neglecting to report on terrorist attacks and killings of Serbian police officers,
as well as for publishing "warrants" for Albanians who did not back the
separatist cause. 8 Since the conclusion of the conflict, some in the Kosovo
independent media have acknowledged a need for standards and training.
Koha Ditore editor Baton Haxhiu signed onto the OSCE Media Board
discussed above, telling one Western journalist that "we need rules for what is
news and what is a lie."8' One report states that, on the whole, many
journalists in Kosovo feel that there should be a means of monitoring the
newly free media during transition.82
Even before the conflict in the province began, a lack of objectivity in
favor of the Kosovar authorities had been highlighted; one commentator has
stated that "many of the ... Albanian papers [that had existed before the
Kosovo conflict] [were] not as critical of the [Kosovar Albanian opposition]
parties as they might have been." 3 In addition, in April 1999, Radio Free
Europe grouped the KLA-controlled Kosovapress agency in with various
Yugoslav state news agencies reportedly releasing "slanted" Kosovo
coverage." On the Serbian side, the Serb minority in Kosovo have no access
to the independent radio and television broadcasting from Belgrade."5
Meanwhile, the state-controlled press remained until recently a mouthpiece of
the Milogevi6 regime and has been accused of exaggerating real events or
fabricating them.8" The strict ethnic segregation throughout the province has
78. Ron Synovitz, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Ethnic Albanian Journalists Work to
Revive Kosovo Media, at http:/lwww.rferl.org/ncalfeaturesl1999/07/f.ru.990707113641.html (July 5,
1999).
79. Media in Yugoslavia, supra note 74.
80. Milivoje Mihajlovid & Mufail Limani, Beta Press, Media in Kosovo, at http://www.beta-
press.conr/eng9.html (Apr. 11, 2000). In addition, the periodicals Kombi and Gazet Shqiptare reportedly
were urging armed insurrection. Id.
81. Smyth, supra note 37.
82. Id.
83. Media in Kosovo, supra note 70.
84. Bob McMahon, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Yugoslavia: Sampling of State-
Controlled Media Reveals Slanted Kosovo Coverage, at http:llwwv.rferl.orglnca/features/1999/04/f.ru.
990412123838.html (Apr. 5, 1999). In the excerpted piece, Kosovar press reported "a fierce battle...
between the units of KLA and the occupation Serbian forces... [t]oday... (t]he Serbian terrorists have
mined and destroyed two mosques in Vushtrri to incriminate NATO bombardments." Id. According to
one report, biased reporting remains a concern in post-war Kosovo as well; one observer notes that
reports in the local Kosovar press are dominated by a negative approach with regard to the Serbian
community, "in which the attribute 'Serbian' is mostly linked to nouns such as 'criminals' and 'villains'
and victims of the Serbian nationality... remain 'abstract' victims and do not become subjects of press
reports which describe individual human destinies." Ana Bardhi, Alternative Information Network, Is
The Press Turning into a Judge?, at http://www.aimpress.orgldyn/traelarchiveldatal200006/ 00616-009
trae-pri.htm (June 16, 2000).
85. THOMPSON, supra note 62, at 66.
86. McMahon, supra note 84. In one such report, Belgrade RTS SAT television reported that
sources close to the Ministry of Defense of Macedonia had informed them that "1500 soldiers of the
German brigade, who are members of the NATO criminal forces deployed in Macedonia, threw down
their weapons this evening and fled to Greece. The German soldiers have left an empty camp behind
them. Weapons have been thrown all over the place." Id.
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continued; one report notes that Albanian media present only an Albanian
viewpoint, and few Albanian or Serbian media have reporters who even
regularly cover the other ethnic group."
At present, the independent media remain under severe pressure.8 One
media analyst has reported that there "is growing pressure by the Kosovo
Liberation Army (U.C.K.) to have its own people control any information
efforts," and there have been reports of "threats to those not willing to tow the
line," as well as death threats against Serbian journalists. 9 Since the
conclusion of the conflict, groups of armed men have taken over at least one
small radio station and broadcast appeals to the Albanian population to attack
the Serb minority." Those media outlets trying to maintain objectivity have
found themselves subject to severe pressure from both sides of the divide.
Prior to the NATO actions last spring, the Albanian-language daily Koha
Ditore was fined $26,800 by the Yugoslav government in March 1999 for
publishing information that "incited hatred between nationalities."'" When
Koha's editors decided not to pay the fine, Serbian police killed their security
guard and burned their offices.92 After the war, when Koha's publisher
condemned the intimidation of the Serbian minority by the Albanian majority,
he was assailed as a "traitor of the Albanian cause" by Kosovapress and was
warned that he was at risk of "eventual and very understandable revenge."9
More generally, local journalists in Kosovo have received regular visits from
"government officials," have been summoned to "informative talks," or have
been directly threatened. 4 In June, Valentina Cuki6, a journalist working for
Radio Kontakt, the only multi-ethnic radio station in Kosovo, was shot and
seriously wounded in the center of Prigtina while wearing KFOR press
87. International Crisis Group, Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy?, at http:ll
www.intl-crisis-group.org (July 7, 2000) [hereinafter Elections in Kosovo].
88. One veteran broadcaster in the region has characterized the media environment in Kosovo
as "a market saturated with sensationalism and extremism." Anthony Borden, The Institute for War and
Peace Reporting, The Battle for Cvilen Transmitter, at http://vww.iwpr.net/index.pl5?balkansindex.
html (Apr. 4,2000).
89. Edward Girardet, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, It Is Indispensable to Rehabilitate
Local Media, at http:lwwv.rferI.orglncalfeatures/1999/07/f.ru.990729132916.html (July 29, 1999).
90. Kosovo's Incipient Media Ministry, supra note 38. The OSCE has also reported that there
have been increasing incidents of unsupported allegations of wartime illegality throughout the press;
according to the OSCE, various parties have been reporting personal details about members of certain
communities-especially the Serbian community-with allegations of illegal activity during the war.
Reports released have included addresses and places of employment, without any proof of involvement
in any illegal activity. OSCE, OSCE Condemns Accusations Without Evidence-Calls for Responsible
Journalism, at http://wwv.osce.org/press.rel/2000/02/245-mik.html (Feb. 25, 2000).
91. Human Rights Watch, Kosovo Human Rights Flash #29: Kosovo Newspaper Resurrected
in Macedonia, at http://www.hnv.org (Apr. 23, 1999).
92. Iso Rusi, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Koha Phoenix, at http://www.iwpr.net
index.pl5?balkans._index.html (Apr. 27, 1999).
93. Borden, supra note 19.
94. The International Crisis Group reports that:
[J]oumalists were called in for interrogation by KLA forces in Prizren after having
reported about activities of the LDK [the more moderate Democratic League of Kosovo].
A Pe6 radio station suddenly went off the air when a telephone poll was reporting thirty
votes for Rugova [head of the LDK and only one for Thaci [head of the KLA]....
[T]here have been so many such cases reported that the OSCE has started working on a
protection program for local journalists.
International Crisis Group, What Happened to the KLA?, at http://www.intl-crisis-group. org (Mar. 3,
2000).
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identification." The OSCE has reported that "[n]ational and international staff
in the [international administration of the province have also] been targeted"
in the press.6
As the survey above shows, the Kosovar media were far from adequate
before the war; they are even less adequate to the task now facing them as a
forum for communication, source of unbiased information, and government
watchdog in a tense post-conflict stalemate between bitter ethnic enemies. In
such an environment, hopes for laying a framework for peaceful coexistence
and democratic development with respect for minorities remain dim. A
responsible media capable of balance, diversity, and independence could,
however, provide a crucial first step toward reconciliation and
democratization in the region. The question remains how best to take this first
step from enmity and bias toward the growth of independent media and the
eventual goal of a multi-ethnic democracy in Kosovo. The proper first step
has remained an agonizing question for the OSCE and the United Nations in
their attempts to foster stability both on the ground and in the media in
Kosovo.
D. UNMIK Regulations 2000/36 and 2000/3 7
As discussed above, the OSCE's Department of Media Affairs has been
the target of criticism by the American press and American journalism
organizations since its inception. Following protests by these groups, the
OSCE decided to withdraw its plans for a Media Regulatory Commission. 7 In
place of international regulation, the OSCE turned to fostering a system of
self-regulation within the Kosovar journalist community. As part of this
program, a professional Code of Conduct was drawn up by the Association of
the Media of Kosovo,98 and a "Court of Honor" was to be created to enforce
its provisions. However, the Code of Conduct was never formally adopted by
the Association, and the "Court of Honor" was never created."
On April 27, 2000, the Albanian daily Dita published an article alleging
that Petar Topoljski, a Serbian employee of UNMIK, had been a Serbian
paramilitary involved in ethnic cleansing and criminal misconduct during the
war in Kosovo.'00 The article published a photograph of Topoljski, as well as
his address and work schedule.' Topoljski was abducted two weeks after the
accusations were printed, and he was later found stabbed to death in a village
outside of Prigtina. °2
95. Free B-92 News, Media Association Expresses Outrage over Journalist Shooting, at http:
//news.freeb92.net (June 22, 2000).
96. OSCE, Outrage over Continued Inflammatory Reporting in Kosovo, at http://wwv.osce.
org/pressrel/2000/03/202-mik.html (Mar. 17,2000).
97. Elections in Kosovo, supra note 87.
98. OSCE, OSCE Sponsors Journalists' Code of Conduct Conference, at http://www.osce.
org/pressrel/2000/03/220-mik.html (Mar. 10, 2000) [hereinafter OSCE Sponsors Journalists' Code of
Conduct Conference].
99. Elections in Kosovo, supra note 87.
100. Bardhi, supra note 84.
101. Llazar Semini, The Institute for War and Peace Reporting, U.N. To Stamp Out Vigilante
Journalism, at http://vww.iwpr.netlindex.pl5?balkansindex.html (June 6, 2000).
102. Id.; see also Nicholas Wood, British Broadcasting Corporation, Kosovo Papers Defy U.N.,
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The killing of Topoljski refocused the international community on the
need for media standards. On June 17, 2000, Special Representative to the
U.N. Secretary-General Bernard Kouchner'03 promulgated two UNMIK
resolutions relating to the conduct of the media in Kosovo. The first,
Regulation 2000/36, created the position of Temporary Media Commissioner
(TMC), an international position which would be "responsible for the
development and promotion of an independent and professional media in
Kosovo and the implementation of a temporary regulatory regime for all
media in Kosovo."'" As an initial matter, the TMC was charged with issuing
broadcast licenses for radio and television operators in Kosovo.'05 The
regulation also authorized the TMC to impose sanctions for failure to adhere
to UNMIK regulations, ranging from the requirement to publish or broadcast a
correction or apology to fines ranging from 1000 to 100,000 marks to the
termination of broadcast licenses. 6 The regulation also provides for the
creation of a Media Appeals Board. The Board is responsible for hearing and
deciding appeals brought by a person or entity on the basis of sanctions
imposed by the TMC10 7
As part of the TMC's mandate in creating a temporary regulatory
regime, Regulation 2000/36 addressed the problem of incitement in particular.
Under a section entitled "Special Provisions," owners, operators, and editors
of media are ordered to refrain from publishing "personal details of any
person, including [the person's] name, address or place of work, if the
broadcast of such details would pose a serious threat to the life, safety or
security of any such person through vigilante violence or otherwise."'' 3 A
second regulation promulgated on the same day, Regulation 2000/37,
authorized the TMC to issue temporary codes of conduct for the media. 9 On
at http://news.bbe.co.uk (July 7, 2000) (describing the publication in Dita of Topoljski's name and
address and Topoljski's subsequent death).
103. The Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) is the head of the civilian
U.N. Mission in Kosovo and is charged with implementation of the international civil presence in
Kosovo. The SRSG also coordinates with the international security presence, KFOR. S.C. Res. 1244,
supra note 12.
104. United Nations Mission in Kosovo, Regulation No. 2000/36 On the Licensing and
Regulation of the Broadcast Media in Kosovo, (entered into force June 17, 2000), at http://wwxv.un.org/
peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg036.html [hereinafter Regulation 2000/36].
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The Media Appeals Board is to be composed of two international members and one
local member who are to be nominated by the Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary-General
for Institution Building. The Special Representative to the Secretary-General is to appoint the members
of the Board and designate one member as President. The Board may uphold, modify, or overturn any
sanction imposed by the TMC, subject to its own rules of procedure, which are to guarantee fair and
impartial proceedings in accordance with internationally recognized human rights standards. Id.
108. Id.
109. United Nations Mission in Kosovo, Regulation No. 2000/37 On the Conduct of the Print
Media in Kosovo (entered into force June 17, 2000), at http:llwww.un.org/peace/kosovo/pagesl
regulations/reg037.html. Pursuant to this authorization, Codes of Conduct for the print and broadcast
media were promulgated. Under the Print Code, publishers are prohibited from publishing or
distributing any material that encourages criminal activity or violence or which carries imminent risk of
causing harm (defined as "death, injury, damage to property or other violence"). In addition, publishers
may not distribute material that denigrates an ethnic or religious group or implies that an ethnic group is
responsible for criminal activity, nor may they attribute criminal responsibility to an individual prior to a
finding of guilt by a lawfully constituted tribunal. A duty to fact check and a right of reply are also
mandated by the Code. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Temporary Code of Conduct for the Print Media in
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the basis of the regulation, Special Representative Bernard Kouchner shut
down Dita for eight days."'
Once again, western journalist organizations were quick to criticize the
new UNMIK regulation. Aidan White, the Secretary General of the
International Federation of Journalists, stated that the regulation was replacing
the rule of law with a dictatorship that would be a poor message for "a region
which was striving to adopt democratic principles, professionalism and
tolerance."'' The World Press Freedom Committee issued a statement that the
rules promulgated "constitute a very dangerous and disturbing precedent for
future media controls by official organs of the international community in
post-conflict zones." '
Clearly, there is room for a difference of opinion on the correct priorities
for media reform and development in Kosovo. While the OSCE and UNMIK
have drawn on European models of media regulation in the formulation of
standards for the Kosovar media,"' the journalist organizations that have
contested the premises of the IJNMIK regulations are representative of a more
libertarian American theory of press regulation. The next sections examine
both the European and American models of regulation, considering the
premises and context of each model in order to evaluate their applicability to
post-conflict societies such as Kosovo.
III. FREE SPEECH, HATE SPEECH, AND DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY
A. Free Speech and Hate Speech in Weimar Germany
In this section, I intend to use the example of World War II Germany as
a model of both the potentially destructive power of the media and of the role
that an active treatment of the relationship between free expression and
equality can have in the development of a peaceful post-war democracy. First,
I will briefly recount the role of the media in inter-war Germany and the post
World War II treatment of the media by the Allied Forces installed in
Germany-a narrative which provides many parallels with the role of the
media in Yugoslavia and in Kosovo, as I have discussed above. I will then
treat the current German theory of free expression and its corresponding case
law as a means of illustrating the role an activist system of hate speech
Kosovo, at http://www.osce.org (last visited Sept. 18, 2000) (on file with The Yale Journal of
International Law).
110. Peter van Agtmael, The Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Dita in the Dock Again, at
http://iwww.iwpr.netindex.pl5?balkansindex.html (July 7, 2000). Despite sanction by UNMIK, Dita
has continued to publish the names and addresses of several individuals it alleged to be war criminals. In
July, it published the photographs of fifteen Serbs it alleged committed crimes against Albanians during
the war in 1999, including two Serbian Orthodox priests, who Dita alleged had "blessed Serbian
paramilitaries after any crime and massacre they committed on Albanians in Kosovo." Llazar Semini,
The Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Kosovo Daily Shut Down, at http://vww.iwpr.net/index.pl5?
balkans index.html (Aug. 1, 2000).
111. Free B-92 News, International Journalists Condemn Kouchner Media Policy, at http:ll
news.freeb92.net (June 26, 2000).
112. Gene Mater, The Freedom Forum, Two Press Groups Assail U.N. Media Rules for
Kosovo, at http:llwww.freedomforum.org/news/2000/06/
2 0 0 0 -O6-2 7 -O7 .asp (June 27, 2000).
113. OSCE, Temporary Media Commissioner Implements Broadcast Code of Conduct, at http:
//www.osce.org/pressrel2000/09/1033-mik.html (Sept. 15, 2000).
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regulation can have in a society attempting a transition from war and intra-
societal strife to a heterogenous democratic order.
The Weimar Republic (1918-1933) guaranteed press freedoms in Article
118 of its constitution, which announced that "every German has the right,
within the bounds of the general laws, to express his opinion freely in word,
writing, print, picture, or in any other manner .... There is no censorship."
'' 14
The limits of the general laws, however, were extensive: "If opinions
expressed in public threatened ... the security of the state and its citizens,
their dissemination could be suppressed," and "the Reich president, with the
emergency powers granted him by Article 48, could extinguish the operability
of Article 118.,,115 Despite these limitations, the press was considered to be a
powerful institution within Germany and was highly decentralized and party-
centered. 116 At the same time, the Nazi press was expanding, though it would
not dominate the media before the National Socialist takeover in 1933. The
main paper of the Nazi party, the V6lkischer Beobachter, was not considered a
source of real information: "it considered itself a combat paper (Kampfblatt)
rather than a newspaper (Zeitung), and in every issue sought to hammer home
its four themes of antiparliamentarianism, nationalism, anti-Semitism, and
anti-Communism."" 7 Within a month of their takeover of the government in
1933, the Nazis quickly outlawed the Social Democrat and Communist parties
and confiscated their press concerns.1 8 The independent papers were
pressured into cooperation with Nazi competitors, while others were taken
over by holding companies related to the main Nazi publishing concerns. 119
Finally, in order to ensure the complete cooperation of all media with the Nazi
propaganda machine, all areas of German intellectual and cultural life were
placed under the Reich Ministry for Education of the People and Propaganda
(Reichsministerium Jar Vflksaufklarung und Propaganda) under Joseph
Goebbels in 1933, and the two German news agencies were folded into the
Nazi-controlled Deutsches Nachrichtenbiro, providing Goebbels with
complete access to the press at all times.12 It was thus, in the face of an
114. Article 118 of the Weimar Constitution, reprinted in MODRIs EKSTEINS, THE LIMITS OF
REASON: THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC PRESS AND THE COLLAPSE OF WEIMAR DEMOCRACY 70 (1975).
115. Id. Interestingly, there were also anti-hate speech provisions in the Weimar Constitution;
there were various prosecutions of anti-Semitic incitement during the Weimar years, and though,
according to some scholars, the majority were handled fairly, the law was narrowly interpreted, and in
many cases unreasonable arguments advanced by anti-Semites were accepted by the courts. Revisions of
the law were hampered by the severe political stalemate that characterized much of the history of the
Weimar Republic. Cyril Levitt, Under the Shadow of Weimar: What Are the Lessons for the Modern
Democracies?, in UNDER THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR: DEMOCRACY, LAW, AND RACIAL INCITEMENT IN
SIX COUNTRIES 15-37 (Louis Greenspan & Cyril Levitt eds., 1993).
116. EKSTEINS, supra note 114, at 74. Eksteins notes that among the German press, attitudes
toward the basic tasks of the journalist were markedly different from those prevalent in the United
States; in Germany correspondents were encouraged to express opinions and judgments, and to
participate in controversies. He quotes one editor from the period as observing "facts ... are not fit for
the reader when served raw; they have to be cooked, chewed, and presented in the correspondent's
saliva." Id. at 73.
117. JOHN SANDFORD, THE MASS MEDIA OF THE GERMAN-SPEAKING COUNTRIES 14 (1976).
118. Id. at 15; PETER J. HUMPHREYS, MEDIA AND MEDIA POLICY IN WEST GERMANY: THE
PRESS AND BROADCASTING SINCE 1945, at 22 (1990).
119. HUMPHREYS, supra note 118, at 23.
120. SANDFORD, supra note 117, at 16. Membership was required for entry into the Press
Chamber after 1934; it was open only to members of Aryan descent, and members could be expelled for
2001]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
embattled democracy with ineffective laws, that despite the existence of a
democratic polity and apparent freedom of speech, media monopolists
emerged and coopted the press. The German media were quickly pressed into
the service of Hitler's Final Solution. Within days of Hitler's grant of
emergency powers by the Reichstag in March 1933, he and Goebbels began
organizing a boycott of all Jewish businesses in Germany, with the aid of the
press. 121 Arrangements had already been made for setting up the firstconcentration camp in Dachau, near Munich. 122
B. The Allied Media Mission in Germany
It was with this history clearly in mind that the Allies took control of the
German press in 1945. The post-war German press was forged through the
programs of the Allies in the years after 1945 in a manner similar to the
current OSCE mission in Kosovo; in fact, the OSCE has drawn this parallel.'
In the aftermath of the Holocaust, the Allies found it necessary to remove
Nazi elements from the press in Germany as part of an overall effort at
"denazification" so as to facilitate the creation of a "free democratic society in
which political and economic power rests upon a broad popular base,
undominated by fascist or militaristic elements."'24 As a result, in October
1944, a group of Anglo-American experts created a three-stage program for
press reconstruction in post-war Germany.2 As German history scholar John
Sandford describes it, the first stage would involve "a total black-out of all
media of information and entertainment;" the second stage would involve
"publication of Allied information sheets;" and "stage three would permit the
appearance of German papers under Allied control.'
26
Following the conclusion of the black-out period, in which the only
papers allowed to publish were the information sheets (Heeresgruppen-
Zeitungen) run by the occupying armies, in May 1945 a licensing system for
the post-war German press was created.'27 This system envisaged the
establishment of a press capable of creating the information matrix necessary
to a democracy, a press which provided Germans with independent and
responsible sources of factual information.'28 Given the history of the press
during the Third Reich, the Allies decreed that no newspaper would be
permitted to use a title that had previously existed in its area and that no
license would issue to any journalist who had written legally in Germany
during the Third Reich, regardless of his political beliefs. 2 Applicants for
publishing material judged to be injurious to the honor of Germany or the Nazi Party. Id.
121. LucY S. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINSTTHE JEWS 1933-1945, at 52-53 (1975).
122. Id. at 51.
123. Kraja, supra note 35.
124. JOHN GIMBEL, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF GERMANY: POLITICS AND THE MILITARY,
1945-1949, at 103 (1968), quoted in Donna E. Arzt, Nuremberg, Denazification and Democracy: The
Hate Speech Problem at the International Military Tribunal, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 689, 723
(1995).
125. SANDFORD, supra note 117, at 18-19.
126. Id. at 19.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. More generally, the press, and other sectors of the German economy, were subject to a
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licenses were subjected to extremely thorough screening by the Information
Control Division (ICD) of the United States Forces, during which applicants
were required to complete background checks, attitudinal interviews, and
psychological exams.3 Licensees were required to use only the Deutsche
Allgemeine Nachrichten-Agentur, a news service founded by the
Psychological Warfare Division of the United States Forces and later managed
by a German licensee, as a news source.' ICD Officers then were required to
inspect the papers to ensure that they did not "propagate National Socialism,
racism, and race hatred ... militaristic ideas, Pan-Germanism, and German
imperialism; [that] they [did] not attempt to create divisions between the
United Nations or foster disrespect for any of the Allies; [and that] they [did]
not criticize military government officials and military government acts."'3
The Allied policy also included a period of retroactive censorship, during
which German libraries were purged by the Americans.'33 The Allies quickly
found that the licensing system created an adequately successful crop of
publications, and the Americans ended their policy of pre-censorship in
September 1945, followed shortly thereafter by the end of pre-censorship in
the British and French sectors.'34 As European media scholar Peter Humphreys
has written, "[t]he way was clear for the constitution of a genuinely free press,
which under the Allies' tutelage was actively encouraged to play an important
role in the construction of liberal democracy."'35 Shortly thereafter, in
December 1945, work began on a Press Law, which would provide a basis for
German supervision of the press.'36 Elementary Press Laws began to be
promulgated in 1948,' 7 and from that point on, regulation of the press was
carried out on a regional level by the Land governments. The German
regulations brought in to supplant the Allied Media Mission would also
formal program of denazification, in which members of the Nazi party who had been more than nominal
participants in its activities were presumed guilty, removed, and excluded from office unless they were
able to rebut their participation in post-hoc individual hearings, first conducted by the Allied
Denazification Policy Board and then by German-administered denazification courts (Spruchkammers).
A discussion of the denazification program is beyond the scope of this Article; for accounts of the
program, see generally, GIMBEL, supra note 124; HAROLD ZINK, THE UNITED STATES IN GERMANY,
1944-1955 (1957); and Arzt, supra note 124, at 724-28.
130. Arzt, supra note 124, at 728. Sandford notes that despite the thoroughness of the screening
process, licenses were granted to various parties: "[Miany had been in exile or in concentration camps,
many were old . . . some were very young, and, as a result of the exclusion of previously active
newspaper men, many had little or no previous experience with the press." SANDFORD, supra note 117,
at 19. Given this reality, the Allies also made the creation ofjoumalism schools a priority. Id. at 21.
131. Arzt, supra note 124, at 729.
132. Joseph Dunner, Information Control in the American Zone of Germany, 1945-1946, in
AMERICAN EXPERIENCES IN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN WORLD WAR H, at 276, 284 (Carl J. Friedrich
ed., 1948).
133. EDWARD N. PETERSON, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF GERMANY: RETREAT TO VICTORY
162 (1978). By some accounts, this policy was doomed to failure, because instead of building a
foundation for the growth of independent, objective media, the Allies had merely replaced the
totalitarian information policy of the Nazis with the totalitarian policy of denazification, in which the
propaganda of the National Socialists was replaced by strict content rules of the Allies. See, e.g.,
Dunner, supra note 132, at 287-88; Arzt, supra note 124, at 730-33. For a more positive account of the
activities of the ICD, see PETERSON, supra, at 162-65.
134. SANDFORD, supra note 117, at23.
135. HUMPHREYS, supra note 118, at 65.
136. SANDFORD, supra note 117, at 23.
137. HUMPHREYS, supra note 118, at 55.
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maintain the commitment to media that would serve as a defense to the
democratic order, as we shall see in the next section.
C. The German Basic Law
The Basic Law, Germany's post-war constitution, was adopted in
1949.138 As the comparative constitutional scholar Ruti Teitel asserts, the
dominant purpose of the Basic Law was transformative, directed to countering
the abuses of power that enabled the evils of the Nazi regime. Toward this
end, presidential powers are merely symbolic under the Basic Law, and
detailed provisions prevent the racial and religious persecution endemic
during the Nazi regime.", More generally, a foundational aspect of the German
constitutional order is wehrhafte demokratie, or militant democracy, which
imposes limitations on the exercise of individual rights by those persons who
would abuse those rights to destroy the democratic order of the country. 4
Implicit in this construct is a clear normative vision of the democratic
polity the Basic Law was to protect. The Basic Law grounds its protective
structure in the service of certain core values, most centrally human dignity.'4'
Thus, the Basic Law creates a positive structure that obligates the state to
protect a set of principles, rooted in justice and equality, which create a
framework for a more stable democratic society.' As Lawrence Lessig notes:
[Germany] believes it must not only assure democracy, but assure the conditions of
democracy. It rejects the idea that a "spontaneous ordering" will assure that the
conditions for democratic thought will exist, or survive, on its own. It doesn't believe in
the invisible hand when applied to the conditions of democracy. Instead, the German
constitution is explicitly directed against certain views of the community that are
inconsistent with principles Germany declares that it holds fimdamental.
43
It is with this community ordering in mind that the Basic Law creates a
hierarchy of rights, circumscribing certain individual rights in the service of
138. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution) (F.R.G.)
139. Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106
YALE L.J. 2009, 2065-66 (1997).
140. This concept reflects the thinking of the German political philosopher Carl Schmitt, who
believed that a democratic constitution had at its core unalterable rules that determined its identity; as
this was the case, procedural rules could not function to abolish the essence of that which they were
designed to effectuate, the democratic rule of the people. The concept of an unalterable constitutional
core also legitimized the creation of institutions designed to prevent a democratic constitution from
being turned against itself. Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARv. INT'L.
L.J. 1, 19 (1995).
141. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. I (F.R.G.) (declaring that "the dignity of man shall be inviolable.
To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority"). In a decision announced in 1975, the
Federal Constitutional Court made this ordering explicit: "The Basic Law has erected a value-oriented
order which places the individual human being and his dignity at the center of all determinations ... and
it is this value judgment of the Constitution that informs the organization and interpretation of the entire
legal order." Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 39, 1 (67) (F.R.G), translated in
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison of the American and
European Approaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305, 322 n.102 (1999).
142. Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American
Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 963, 967 (1997); see also Teitel, supra note 139, at 2067
(noting that the positive rights structure of transitional postauthoritarian constitutions like Germany's is
another means of countering the illiberal tendencies of past regimes).
143. Lawrence Lessig, Post Constitutionalism, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1422, 1463 (1996) (reviewing
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995)).
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human dignity. In the context of freedom of speech, the right to speech is not
valued as an end in itself, but also as a duty of civility and respect within a
recovering post-war polity. German media law scholar Friedrich Kibler has
written that German lawmakers were "inspired by a continuing, if not
increasing, concern as to how the new or renewed use of language attacking,
degrading, and dehumanizing stereotyped or artificially constructed groups
may harm not only the victims, but equally the social and cultural web of a
civilized community."'"
The guarantee of free expression is contained in Article Five of the
Basic Law: "Everyone has the right freely to express and disseminate his
opinion by speech, writing, and pictures and freely to inform himself from
generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting
by means of broadcast and films are guaranteed. There shall be no
censorship."'45 This right, however, is limited by its own terms; Section Two
permits the limitation of the right "by the provisions of the general laws, the
provisions of laws for the protection of youth, and the right to inviolability of
personal dignity."'46
The most direct limitation on the freedom of speech is within the Basic
Law itself: Article Eighteen declares that those who abuse the exercise of their
human rights, including the right to free speech "in the combat against the free
democratic order," forfeit those rights.'47 This decision may be made only by
the Federal Constitutional Court in a proceeding that may be instituted by the
Federal Parliament, the Federal Government, or a Land government. 41 This
provision has proven to be of little practical import, however; only two
proceedings have been brought under Article Eighteen, one in 1960 against
Otto-Ernst Remer, former president of the Sozialistische Reichspartei, the
successor to the Nazi party, and the second against Dr. Gerhard Frey, a right-
wing publisher, in 1974. The Constitutional Court dismissed both cases
because neither individual was held to be a threat to the constitutional order. 49
The right of free speech in the German constitutional order is also
subject to limitations found in the general laws, including the Criminal Code.
Three provisions of importance are Articles 130 and 131, both of which are
144. Friedrich Kfibler, How Much Freedom for Racist Speech?: Transnational Aspects of a
Conflict of Human Rights, 27 HoFsTRA L. REV. 335, 355 (1998); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS
TALK 71 (1991) (quoting Federal Constitutional Court decision of July 7, 1970, translated in Donald P.
Kommers, Liberty and Community in Constitutional Law: The Abortion Cases in Comparative
Perspective, 1985 BYU L. REv. 371, 403) ("[T]he concept of man in the Basic Law is not that of an
isolated, sovereign individual; rather, the Basic Lav resolves the conflict between the individual and the
community by relating and binding the citizen to the community, but without detracting from his
individuality.").
145. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 5 § 1 (F.R.G.).
146. Id. art. 5§2.
147. Id. art. 18.
148. Rainer Hofmann, Incitement to National and Racial Hatred: The Legal Situation in
Germany, in STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
159, 162 (Sandra Coliver ed., 1992).
149. Id., at 162 (citing BverfGE 11, 282 (Remer case); BverfGE 38, 23 (Frey case)). See
generally Juliane Wetzel, The Judicial Treatment of Incitement against Ethnic Groups and of the Denial
of National Socialist Mass Murder in the Federal Republic of Germany, in UNDER THE SHADOW OF
WEI MAR, supra note 115, at 88-89 (summarizing the proceedings and verdicts in the cases of Remer and
Grey).
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framed as crimes against public peace, and Article 185, which punishes
offenses against personal honor.'
Article 130 imposes a sanction of a fine or imprisonment of up to five
years against any person who incites hatred or invites violence or arbitrary
acts against parts of the population, or insults, maliciously degrades, or
defames parts of the population, in a manner likely to disturb the public
peace.'
Article 131 of the Criminal Code prohibits the writing or distribution of
writing that "depicts cruel or otherwise inhumane acts of violence against
persons in such a manner as to glorify or deny the wrongfulness of such
acts." 52 The maximum penalty under the section is imprisonment for one
year.'53 Reports on current events and history are expressly exempt from
prosecution under the provision."
Article 185 of the Criminal Code makes punishable an insult or an
offense against personal honor. 5 Until 1985, this provision only applied to
individuals and required a personal petition; as amended, the private petition
requirement may be waived where "(1) the crime of insult was committed
through a writing or broadcast; (2) the victim suffered persecution under the
National Socialists or any other form of tyranny; and (3) the persecuted group
is part of the German population."'5 6 Under the provision, proof of the truth is
no defense "when the insult arises from the manner in which the assertion was
made or disseminated or the circumstances in which it was made.'1
5 7
Finally, free speech rights may also be limited by broadcasting
regulations. A Broadcasting Interstate Agreement promulgated in 1996
prohibits programs "which incite hatred against parts of the population ... or
which propagate violence and discrimination against such parts or groups, or
which attack the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously ridiculing
or defaming parts of the population."'50
D. Hate Speech and Free Speech in German Jurisprudence
The case law relating to the provisions of the German Basic Law and
Criminal Code mentioned previously provides a glimpse into the role an
150. Hofmann, supra note 148, at 162.
151. § 130 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] (F.R.G.). See Kilbler, supra note 144, at 344-
45.
152. § 131 StGB, translated in David E. Weiss, Striking a Difficult Balance: Combatting the
Threat of Neo-Nazism in Germany While Preserving Individual Liberties, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
899, 925-26 (1994).
153. Id.at925n.194.
154. Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the
"Auschwitz"-and Other-"Lies", 85 MICH. L. REv. 277,285 (1986).
155. Id. at 286. For a deeper discussion and comparison of the German, French, and American
approaches to civility, insult, and hate speech, see James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect:
Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279 (2000).
156. § 194(1) StGB, translated in Weiss, supra note 152, at 926.
157. § 192 StGB, translated in Stein, supra note 154, at 286.
158. KiIbler, supra note 144, at 346-47. Broadcasting in Germany is reserved to the
competence of the Linder; this regulation was promulgated by an accord in 1991 and amended in 1996.
Id. Ktibler reports that the broadcasting regulations have never been contested before a court and are
strictly obeyed. Id.
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activist model of hate speech regulation may play within a maturing
democracy. As an initial matter, interestingly, the provisions in the Criminal
Code which circumscribe the Basic Law guarantee of free speech have not
been subject to constitutional or academic challenges. German constitutional
scholar Eric Stein has written that "[i]f other courts had harbored any doubt
about the constitutional issue [of the Criminal Code provisions limiting the
Basic Law right of free speech] they would have been required by the
prevailing law to refer the question to the Federal Constitutional Court. There
is no record of any such referral."'59 In addition, there has been little academic
discussion on the compatibility of Articles 130, 131, and 185 with the right of
free speech, presumably because there is a shared perception that "acts by
private persons likely to incite racial hatred are not protected by the right to
freedom of speech.""r A brief survey of the case law of the German
Constitutional Court highlights a low tolerance for hate speech in the balance
between free speech and equal dignity within German society.
The case of the Action Front of the National Socialists (ANS) provides a
window on the clear limits of the free speech guarantee within the context of
hate speech in the German system. A member of the ANS was convicted for
participation in an ANS event in Hamburg, in which the group paraded in
black uniform with Nazi accouterments, and three members of the group
carried a sign which read "I, a donkey, still believe that Jews were 'gassed' in
German concentration camps. I, a donkey, believe the 'gassing' lies and want
to pay, pay, pay to Israel. I, a donkey, still believe the propaganda lies of the
'victors."" ' The lower court found the defendant guilty of incitement to racial
hatred, and on appeal, the Constitutional Court refused to accept the
defendant's claim of unconstitutionality on the grounds that "the interpretation
and application of Articles 130 and 131 by the competent courts did not
disclose any violation of basic freedoms." 62 Thus, German case law has made
it clear that the protections of the free speech guarantee will not be extended
to language considered threatening to the dignity of groups within German
society.
One judgment on an appeal from the court of Braunschweig highlights
the low threshold required for a finding of incitement under Article 130. A
defendant had been charged with distribution of a brochure which claimed
that the use of the gas chambers and the genocide of the Holocaust had never
occurred, and that the Jews had tortured and murdered victims in order to
procure false testimony.'63 The defendant was convicted and fined for
distributing materials which incited hatred under Article 131, but was
159. Stein, supra note 154, at 288. Interestingly, in cases where convictions for hate speech
have been appealed to the European Commission of Human Rights, an institution which screens appeals
for referral to the European Court of Human Rights, the Commission has found the appeals to be
"manifestly unfounded." For a discussion of the European and international jurisprudence on hate
speech and freedom of speech, see Elizabeth F. Defeis, Freedom of Speech and International Norms: A
Response to Hate Speech, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57 (1992).
160. Hofinann, supra note 148, at 166.
161. Id. at 167.
162. BverfGE, reprinted in 35 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1803 (1982), translated in
Hofmann, supra note 148, at 167.
163. Stein, supra note 154, at 291-93.
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acquitted on the more serious charges of incitement under Article 130. On
appeal, the Federal Supreme Court found the defendant guilty under Article
130, on the grounds that the brochure was "apt to provoke an emotional,
hostile stance toward the Jews.""' In an earlier decision, the Constitutional
Court had found that in an Article 130 action the act alleged need not actually
incite a breach of public peace; it would be sufficient if there were adequate
grounds for the belief that the act would shatter confidence in legal security on
the part of the group under attack, or that the existing predisposition of others
to attack the group would be increased.16
Additionally, under current German law, mere denial of the Holocaust,
whether uttered as an incitement, an expression of opinion, or even in
translation of another's words, may be prosecuted under Article 130. This
amendment to the law came out of the case of Gunter Deckert, a leader of the
National Democratic Party, who had organized a rally at which an American
neo-Nazi leader claimed in a speech that there had never been gas chambers at
Auschwitz. Deckert had translated the speech and tried to publish it.'"
Following an acquittal on the grounds that the publication of another person's
denial of the Holocaust could not constitute incitement to racial hatred, the
legislature amended Section 130 to include the crime of "bare denial of the
Holocaust."' 67
It emerges from these cases that, unlike in American free speech
jurisprudence where the dividing line between protected and regulable speech
is drawn between advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action,'" the
line in Germany remains dictated by whether the speech represents a potential
threat to the values of mutual respect and equality espoused in the Basic
Law. 69 This reflects the recent memory of the capture of the national media by
the Nazis during the Weimar era, as well as the terror that followed it. In this
light, the restrictions on hate speech can be seen as organizing principles for
an evolving post-war society, in which equality and dignity would be
militantly protected against threats from intolerant groups in order that all
could participate in the developing German democracy. These principles of
equality and equal dignity can also prove crucial today in Kosovo, so long as
there is a real commitment to a multi-ethnic democracy for the province.
At the same time, many who view the cases discussed above in the
context of a fully developed German constitutional democracy see the
approach of German jurisprudence to the problem of hate speech as unduly
restrictive.'7° To these critics, the hate-related incursions on free-speech rights
in Germany smack of censorship, and many would challenge the premise that
164. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHStJ (F.R.G.), reported in
1981 Neue Zeitschrift fur Strafrecht 258 (1981), translated in Hofinann, supra note 148, at 169. See
Hofmann, supra, at 168-69; Stein, supra note 154, at 291-93.
165. BGHSt 16, 49 (F.R.G.). See Hofinann, supra note 148, at 169; Stein, supra note 154, at
293.
166. For a discussion of the Deckert case, see Douglas-Scott, supra note 141, at 320-2 1.
167. Id.
168. See infra Section IV.B.
169. Donald P. Kommers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United States and the
Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 657, 693 (1980).
170. E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: A MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 223-26 (1996).
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it is the task of government to restrict the right of opinion of its citizens when
those in power are persuaded that it is false and that some group would be
wounded by its publication.' These same concerns have animated criticism of
the media reform efforts currently taking place in Kosovo. These critiques
reflect a rather different conception of the role of government and rights to
speech within society-an approach prevalent within American jurisprudence,
to which we now turn.
IV. THE AMERICAN PARADIGM
A. American Free Speech Theory
The American model of hate speech regulation provides a second
potential trajectory of post-war media reform, a model in which a respect for
individual autonomy and independence from governmental meddling combine
to produce a libertarian system of press regulation, and in which limits on
media discourse are countenanced only in exceptional circumstances.
However, this model is the end product of the unique set of historical and
social circumstances that have shaped American society. Thus, I intend to
look briefly at the development of American incitement and hate speech
theory through the twentieth century as a means of underscoring this
exceptionalism and the limited utility of applying the rules in place in a hardy
multi-ethnic polity to a society in which democratic thought, and even peace
itself, have barely taken hold.
The American free speech guarantees of the First Amendment evolved
against the background of a rather different historical and philosophical
inheritance. The free speech rights of the First Amendment, as well as the
other rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, reflected an eighteenth-century
conception of rights, which framed liberty as a state in which individual rights
were to be constrained by the designs of government only for limited
purposes. This is in direct contrast to the German concept of militant
democracy, which sees the state as obligated to guarantee the proper
conditions so that rights may be realized for all members of society, even if
this necessitates incursions on the freedoms of some.'
In addition, as is often noted, the United States was a nation born of
dissent and distrust of government institutions. Thus, at least one scholar has
posited that free speech can be defended on the basis of an "argument from
governmental incompetence," in which "[fjreedom of speech is based in large
part on a distrust of the ability of government to make the necessary
distinctions, a distrust of governmental determinations of truth and falsity, an
appreciation of the fallibility of political leaders, and a somewhat deeper
distrust of governmental power in a more general sense."''
171. Id. at 225.
172. Eberle, supra note 142, at 969 ("The American Constitution simply provides the outline
for government, concentrating on limiting official power. Our Constitution lacks any positive element
that requires affirmative government action to enforce our rights.").
173. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 86 (1982).
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Given this perceived ineptitude of the government, American free
speech jurisprudence in this century has increasingly been organized around
the concept that unfettered free speech and the open debate of ideas best
facilitates the search for truth. This proposition is reflected strongly in Justice
Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
174
Thus, truth is defined as that which survives the process of rivalry in the
marketplace. 's Despite the strong argument that an unregulated market may
be "skewed by the forces that dominate society,"'76 the unregulated free
market model of the First Amendment has remained an enduring symbol of
the free speech paradigm throughout American case law.'"
Even in this apparently free market, however, not all speech is granted
access. American free speech jurisprudence does recognize certain speech of
lesser value that may be constitutionally regulated, including obscenity, child
pornography, and libel. 7 Within the sphere of constitutionally protected
speech, however, the doctrine of clear and present danger remains a
touchstone of American free speech jurisprudence. Under this test, lawfully
prohibited words are "used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent.' ' 79 As a survey of American case
law reveals, the clear and present danger test has become more stringent and
the marketplace of ideas more unregulated over the course of the twentieth
century.
B. American Jurisprudence
Early historical narratives of American First Amendment doctrine
depicted a nation with strong free speech protections from the time of its
inception. 18° In 1960, legal historian Leonard W. Levy challenged theselibertarian conceptions, arguing that the Framers intended the First
174. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
175. SCHAUER, supra note 173, at 20.
176. Owen Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791 (1987).
177. E.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943) ("[If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion. .
178. Recent decisions such as R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) have thrown
assumptions about the ability to regulate even lower-value speech into question. See the discussion infra
Section IV.B. See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 171 (1993)
(noting that "even within the category of unprotected or low-value speech, such as commercial or libel
speech, it seems clear that government may not be unacceptably selective").
179. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
180. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1-24 (1948) (interpreting the
American Revolution as a battle for free expression, in which the insubstantial speech protections of the
British constitution were replaced with robust First Amendment defenses).
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Amendment to prevent nothing more than prior restraints on speech. 181
Indeed, the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 provided a formidable rhetorical
challenge to the proponents of the notion of unfettered free speech in early
American history; it made criminal "any false, scandalous and malicious"
writings and publications against the government.1
8 2
At the time the first free speech cases were brought before the Supreme
Court during the First World War, there was widespread support for the
suppression of radical speech. I1 3 The Espionage Act of 1917, which
criminalized agitation against the war, served as the basis for convictions in
several, resulting in the affirmation of convictions for circulation of pamphlets
(Schenck v. United States),184 papers (Gitlow v. New York),1 85 and circulars
(Abrams v. United States),186 as well as newspaper publishing (Frohwerk v.
United States).187 Though Abrams resonates with scholars and historians today
for its dissent, it is worth remembering that the majority opinion in that case
and others provided the basis for criminal convictions for political speech.
After the Second World War, the fear of a possible resurgence of
National Socialism in Germany was replaced by an American fear of an ever
increasing threat from communism in light of the consolidation of communist
control across Eastern Europe and a new nuclear threat. In the face of these
new threats, there was a retreat from the clear and present danger test
advocated by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in the 1920s. In the new, less
protective version of the test, the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
probability, justified the invasion of free speech necessary to avoid the
danger.188 On this basis, eleven leaders of the American Communist Party
were convicted for advocating the overthrow of the United States government
in Dennis v. United States.189 In post-war Germany, the memory of the
National Socialist takeover and the Holocaust loomed large in the building of
the Basic Law and would remain predominant in the protective jurisprudence
of the German Constitutional Court. However, the various opinions in Dennis
doubt the seriousness of the communist threat. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Douglas noted that "[c]ommunism has been so thoroughly exposed in
181. See LEONARD V. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 233-38 (1960). For an exposition of Levy's argument that a libertarian
theory of free expression did not emerge until the Jeffersonian battle against the Sedition Act of 1798,
see generally id. at 249-3 09.
1S2. Levy argues that it is clear from the debates before the passage of the Act that its
proponents believed that the political opinion of the opposition constituted seditious libel and could be
prosecuted under the Act. Id. at 259.
183. [D]uring the First World War there was an overwhelming popular consensus that
radical political speech, which was obstructive of the Wilson administration's war efforts,
should be suppressed. Public intolerance of political radicalism escalated during the Red
Scare of 1919-20, as evidenced by the enactment in some thirty-five states of legislation
criminalizing speech with a tendency to produce unlawful actions aimed at promoting
radical economic or political change.
Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV.
1, 35 (1996).
184. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
185. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
186. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
187. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
188. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
189. Id.
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this country that it has been crippled as a political force. Free speech has
destroyed it as an effective political party."'
90
Justice Douglas's statement highlights a central attribute of press and
speech freedoms in the post-war United States. There was no need to see
communism, antiwar activists, or other dissenters as threats to the democratic
order, because of a perception that there was a truly free market of ideas in
operation, within which these dissenting propositions would be subject to
fierce competition.
One view would be that Justice Douglas's perception reflected the
reality of the press at that point. Unlike the German press, which had emerged
from the war in a state of ruin and tainted by complicity with the National
Socialist regime, the American press had grown over 150 years in the context
of a deepening democracy. As Fred Siebert noted in 1956, the press had
remained almost completely free from government influence for 200 years
and had been encouraged to serve as a "Fourth Estate" in the governing
process.191 In the face of increasing consolidation of press holdings in the
twentieth century, there was an increasing movement for social responsibility
among journalists that stressed the fair representation of all forms of debate to
ensure that the public had enough information to decide matters for itself.'I
More generally, it can be argued that the nature of American identity
also contributed to this freewheeling debate. As the journalist William Pfaff
has maintained, American nationalism is ideological rather than ethno-
national in origin.93 The United States was a creation of political ideas;
originally citizen loyalties extended not to the nation as a whole, but to the
states.'9 It was with the consolidation of the federal state after the Civil War
that an American nationalism coalesced-not around a people, but around an
idea. As Pfaff writes:
What originally was an Enlightenment, Northern European, white Protestant Christian
society with a formal commitment to a historically identifiable set of intellectual as well
as political values has become something quite different, not only as the result of the
passage of historical time but increasingly as the consequence of choices made: those of
secularism and materialism, a market test for values, a non-directive education, non-
European immigration, and most recently (if tentatively) the effort to adopt a
multiculturalist and multiracialist social system-all of them ideological choices.1
95
These choices, it can be argued, had created the prerequisites for what
Lessig has termed a "positive construction of tradition," as I have discussed
above. A nation committed not to a single ethnonational identity, but to a set
of principles, including a free market for ideas, does not run the risk of
silencing alternative views of history and identity, as no view may be seen as
definitive. This self-conception is replicated in the American notion of free
speech. As Robert Post notes, the American form of democracy allows any
190. Id. at 588 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
191. Fred S. Siebert, Introduction, in FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS, supra note 47, at 4-5.
192. Id.
193. WILLIAM PFAFF, THE WRATH OF NATIONS: CIVILIZATION AND THE FURIES OF
NATIONALISM 161 (1993). For another account of the exceptional nature of both United States and Latin
American nationalism, see ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 47-65.
194. PFAFF, supra note 193, at 173-175.
195. Id. at 165-66.
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vision of the nation to prevail in public discourse. It is thus axiomatic that the
American democratic order cannot bar anything from public discussion. 96
It is in this context that the American conception of freedom of speech
stands in starkest contrast to that of Germany. Given the institutionalized
acceptance of multiple views of American society and the perceived openness
of the market for ideas within the United States, the Supreme Court has not
limited the constitutional protections of free speech only to ideas that are true,
popular, or socially useful 97 The Court remains committed "to the principle
that debate of public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."'
98
This shift from a free speech policy protective of government order to a
policy recognizing individual free speech liberties as paramount is also echoed
in American hate speech jurisprudence. In 1952, in Beauharnais v. Illinois,
the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a white supremacist for
distributing a petition calling for the protection of the white race from
enroachment by African-Americans.' 99 In upholding the Illinois group libel
statute that provided the basis for the conviction, the Court noted that "willful
purveyors of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups ... tend ... to
... obstruct ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot community," 200 and upheld
the statute on the grounds that the speech sanctioned was libelous and also
could be construed as fighting words, which were outside the protection of the
First Amendment."' Subsequent decisions, however, have called the vitality of
this decision into question.
The failure to recognize racist speech as language protected by the First
Amendment would be the strongest statement the Court would make against
racist discourse.2 The civil rights movement and the anti-Vietnam war
demonstrations led the Court to be more distrustful of government claims that
dangerous speech needed to be suppressed." 3 As the protests and political and
social reforms progressed over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, it became
increasingly clear that in many cases the protections of the First Amendment
provided an invaluable vehicle to gather support for the redress of grievances.
Generally, it was thought that the best way to counter hate speech was with
more speech; that subjecting racist ideas to the marketplace of ideas was the
best way to foster debate and move forward on these issues. More
importantly, however, is the context in which this unfettered debate took
196. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225,
1279 (1999).
197. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,444 (1963).
198. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
199. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
200. Id. at 259. The Illinois group libel statute prohibited the publication of material which
"portrays 'depravity, criminality, or lack of virtue,' of 'a class of citizens of any race, color, creed, or
religion,' and exposes such a class to 'contempt, derision, or obliquy,' or 'is productive of breach of the
peace or riots."' Id. at 270-71 (section numbers omitted).
201. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
202. Indeed, the Beauharnais decision was widely criticized by various commentators of the
period. David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 445, 449 n.24 (1987).
203. Donald A. Downs, Racial Incitement Law and Policy in the United States: Drawing the
Line Between Free Speech and Protection Against Racism, in UNDER THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR, supra
note 115, at 113. See, e.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), in which the Supreme Court reversed
the refusal of the Georgia House of Representatives to seat Julian Bond, a civil rights activist who had
been elected to the House, because of statements he had made criticizing U.S. Vietnam policy.
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place. By the mid-twentieth century, the United States had enjoyed nearly 200
years of continuous democratic rule. Despite the contest of passionately held
views implicated in the battle for civil rights, the future of American
democracy was never in question. The strongest statement of this background
principle can be found in Cooper v. Aaron,2°1 in which the Supreme Court
addressed the refusal of Arkansas state officials to abide by the Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.2 15 In the face of massive resistance
on the part of southern officials (and the willingness of the District Court in
the case to grant postponement of the desegregation program in the face of
"chaos, bedlam, and tunnoil") 16 the Supreme Court, in one of the most
famous expositions of its power, had the institutional confidence to declare
that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court
and this country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our Constitution.
...207 It was on the basis of this stability that the spirit of Brown could be
upheld in the face of direct challenge.
Against this background, the final exposition of the clear and present
danger test was advanced in the case of Brandenburg v. Ohio.205 Brandenburg
overturned a criminal syndicalism statute that prohibited the advocacy of
crime or violence "as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform. '209 The defendant, a member of the Ku Klux Klan, had been convicted
for his statement, during a rally, that "if our President, our Congress, our
Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible
there might have to be some revengeance taken. '210 The Court drew a
distinction between the abstract teaching of the need for violence and direct
preparation for violence and held that a statute that did not draw a distinction
between mere advocacy and preparation "[swept] within its condemnation
speech which our Constitution has immunized from government control."
1''
Thus, the Court set a new standard for permissible restraints on incitement,
which remains the standard today: "[A] State [cannot] forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action. 21 2 This requirement of imminence reset the line
of permissible censorship to a level far more protective of racist incitement
than that of the German Constitutional Court, denying First Amendment
protection only where speech is likely to produce immediate violence.
21
1
On this basis, in Collin v. Smith, a District Court in Illinois held
unconstitutional ordinances preventing neo-Nazis from marching through a
204. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
205. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
206. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 25 (13th ed. 1997).
207. 358 U.S. at 18.
208. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
209. Id. at 444-45.
210. Id. at 446.
211. Id. at 448.
212. Id. at 447.
213. Kommers, supra note 169, at 693 (contrasting the Supreme Court's permissive approach
with the German Supreme Court's more restrictive approach). See supra Section III.D.
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predominantly Jewish suburb.2"4 While the attorney for the town of Skokie
argued on the basis of Beauharnais that racist speech was not within the
coverage of the First Amendment, the court of appeals reviewing the case
found that "it may be questioned... whether the tendency to induce violence
approach would pass constitutional muster today.'2 11 The lower court also
noted that the interests in avoiding unrest were outweighed by the interests in
unfettered discourse: "[I]t is better to allow those who preach racial hate to
expend their venom in rhetoric rather than to be panicked into embarking on
the dangerous course of permitting the government to decide what its citizens
may say and hear.
'216
The Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul217 is the
apotheosis of this idea. The case involved a group of teenagers who had
allegedly burned a cross on the lawn of a black family who had moved into a
formerly all-white neighborhood. The defendant had been charged with a
misdemeanor under a statute that punished the placing on private property of a
symbol which "arouses anger, alarm or resentment ... on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender." 218 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority
invalidating the ordinance, argued that "[t]he point of the First Amendment is
that majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than
silencing speech on the basis of its content., 219 Thus, in the eyes of many
commentators, the content-neutrality requirement announced in R.A.V
possibly sounded the death knell for hate crime laws that outlaw racist speech.
The First Amendment absolutism of R.A. V has not gone unchallenged,
however. In his concurrence to the decision, Justice Stevens wrote:
This [majority] analysis fundamentally miscomprehends the role of "race, color, creed,
religion [and] gender" in contemporary American society. One need look no further than
the recent social unrest in the Nation's cities to see that race-based threats may cause
more harm to society and to individuals than other threats.... Although it is regrettable
that race occupies such a place and is so incendiary an issue, until the Nation matures
beyond that condition, laws such as St. Paul's ordinance will remain reasonable and
justifiable.
220
In the years since the decision in R.A. V, there have been voices within
the American academy who have challenged the premises of the Court's
approach to hate speech. Richard Delgado argues that the problem of hate
speech can be analyzed in two ways: "one perspective puts speech at the
center, and demands that proponents of anti-racism rules justify the
abridgment of that liberty;" the other "puts equal dignity at the center, and
regards the speech-act as a violation.",221 There is also a concern that hate
214. 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
215. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted) (referencing
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
216. 447 F. Supp. at 702.
217. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
218. Id. at 377.
219. Id. at 392.
220. Id. at 434 n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring).
221. Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, in
STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 284, 288
(Sandra Coliver ed., 1992).
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speech "may silence a minority and exclude its members ... from commun-
icative interaction and from integration into the fabric of a civilized
society.' ,222 This, it is argued, makes the marketplace of ideas an "untenable
paradigm," silencing the speech of minorities and infecting the market as a
whole with the contagion of racism. 223 Nonetheless, for right or wrong, there
remains a strong notion in the United States that open debate is the best way
of resolving these issues; that, as Ronald Dworkin has argued, "freedom is
important enough even for sacrifices that really hurt.
224
In an engaging survey of the rhetorical treatment given hate speech in
American courts, Mayo Moran posits that while the decision to review hate
speech cases within the rubric of subversive advocacy may have been
established by the facts of Brandenburg,225 the consequences of this
characterization are far reaching. 226 When the courts portray Klansmen or
cross-burning teens as dissidents, they reveal a deep uneasiness with the use
of political pressure to silence dissenting views that is central to American
free speech jurisprudence.2 2 7 The courts' approaches to this issue reflect two
major concerns: a concern with government favoritism for certain points of
view, as well as a larger concern that by taking sides in the fight against hate
speech, the government may chill not only the speech of the Klan and neo-
Nazis, but also protected speech on controversial issues. 228 The freedom to see
these matters as points along a spectrum of reasoned debate is an expression
of the strength of the American democratic order. Though the seriousness of
the threat from racist speech remains very much a contested matter, this threat
does not rise to the level of a threat to the democratic order itself, as it did in
World War II Germany and does in present-day Kosovo. Thus, although the
wide open debate of the modem American press and polity may be a worthy
long-term goal for Kosovo, its utility as a model for post-conflict media
development is limited, as I will discuss further in Part V.
V. HATE SPEECH AND POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES
In his commentary on R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Professor Friedrich
Kfibler notes that while the Court's protection of hate speech "may reflect an
accurate understanding of the issue within the sophisticated web of the
political process in a country like the United States, it is much less than an
adequate description of what has happened and happens in other places. 229
222. Kfibler, supra note 144, at 367.
223. Charles R. Lawrence III, IfHe Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
53, 76-79 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993).
224. DWORKIN, supra note 170, at 226.
225. The criminal syndicalism statute overturned in Brandenburg was similar to statutes
applied to radicals and communists in the early twentieth century.
226. Mayo Moran, Talking About Hate Speech: A Rhetorical Analysis of American and
Canadian Approaches to the Regulation of Hate Speech, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1425, 1436-37.
227. Id. at 1438-39.
228. Id. at 1450-51 (citing Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1207 (7th Cir. 1978) (arguing that
the challenged ordinance could "be applied to criminalize dissemination of The Merchant of Venice or a
vigorous discussion of the merits of reverse racial discrimination")).
229. Kilbler, supra note 144, at 361.
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Indeed, the idea and possibility of the existence of a free marketplace of ideas
varies greatly across national contexts, as I have noted above."' In the United
States, the First Amendment jurisprudence of the twentieth century has been
enacted before a background of 200 years of a continuous democracy and
relatively few threats to open political discourse. In Kosovo and in Nazi
Germany, chauvinistic elites have coopted the media, and have constructed
differences between groups, dehumanizing minorities as a means of gaining
political power. In this way, an unregulated market in ideas has been
dominated by monopolists. In weak democracies such as Weimar, as we see
today in the nascent protectorate that is Kosovo, multi-ethnic polities may not
have the roots to withstand the threat of totalitarianism and hate. In the history
of this century, there is ample evidence of the apocalypses that have resulted
from these movements, and may well continue to result in places like
Kosovska Mitrovica. In the face of a monopolistic threat, market regulation
may be necessary in order to provide access to smaller players who, in the
face of elite-sponsored hatred, may be the only voices of moderation and
tolerance. Finally, in the environment of brutality and enmity that pervades
Kosovo, the idea that chauvinistic views will be subject to fierce competition
in a marketplace of ideas is na've. David Kretzmer has asserted that "there is
no lack of historical evidence to show that in the short run false views are
often the most salable goods in the market of ideas."23' Some degree of market
regulation in favor of tolerance and reconciliation appears necessary in the
aftermath of the enormous brutality we have seen perpetrated in Kosovo. In
this context, it could be said that the danger of suppressing disfavored ideas is
outweighed by the danger that permitting discussion of these ideas may
encourage their acceptance. 2
In addition, the political context of hate speech must be taken into
account. As Donna Arzt notes, "[i]ncitement ... is a contextual matter.
Whether an utterance will lead to a more dangerous act depends on the
political and social climate as well as the circumstances of a particular
setting." 13 The United States, with its history free of true threats from
totalitarian alternatives, can adhere to a system of tolerance, confident in its
ability to repel threats through open discourse. In Germany, the memory of the
Nazis' rise to power during the Weimar regime has left a residue of
skepticism about the power of free debate to defeat the voices of exclusion
and totalitarianism. 4 In Kosovo, given the current political situation of an
uneasy truce between ethnically-charged elites on both sides, calls for attacks
on minorities or revenge against political rivals are not merely fighting words
or insults; they are direct threats to the foundation of a post-conflict
representative democracy. If the parties favoring a multi-ethnic, peaceful
230. The United States is somewhat unique in its lack of legal restrictions on racial incitement;
Australia, Canada, France, India, Israel, the Netherlands, and South Africa, among others, have all
adopted legislation placing legal restraints on hate speech. See STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 221.
231. Kretzmer, supra note 202, at 469.
232. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 686-87 (N.D. Ill. 1978), (cited in Kretzmer, supra note
202, at 472).
233. Arzt, supra note 124, at 753.
234. Fox & Nolte, supra note 140, at 37.
2001]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW V
Kosovo are to survive in this environment, this speech must be considered a
clear and present danger that the authorities have a right to prevent.
An acceptance of JNIK's hate speech regulation will also send a very
important message to both Albanians and Serbs on the ground in Kosovo, at a
time when such impressions are uniquely important.235 As one scholar has
noted, hate speech laws represent "a vehicle by which society can express its
values and the limits of what it will tolerate."236 As I have stated above, the
media is in a unique position to act as a defender or as an assailant of the ideal
of equality: social construction of reality theory posits that in a fundamentally
ambiguous social world, the meaning of events is not inherent, but is created
by the press.237 As a medium of communication, the press can both reinforce
existing prejudices and create the impression that these prejudices are shared
by one's peer group. This message is of superlative importance in Kosovo,
where a statement affirming ideals of equality and respect for minorities may
lay the framework for a burgeoning sense of tolerance in the province.
There is also the matter of the declaratory value of hate speech
regulation in a political sense. The formal condemnation of hate speech sends
a powerful message that the new regime takes equality seriously.258 In a period
of transition and reconstruction, this is of paramount importance, not only to
the transformation of inter-ethnic understandings, but also to the creation of
representative democracy itself. A formal acceptance of the principles of
equality and equal dignity may lay the framework for refugee returns, an
increasingly integrated polity, and a more stable foundation for the future. 39
Finally, the institution of hate speech regulation can also play a role in
fostering a press capable of communicating multifaceted information to a
developing post-conflict democracy. This was considered an important task in
post-war Germany, as discussed earlier. In Kosovo, journalist training and
self-regulatory press organizations have been an important OSCE initiative.240
The restriction of inciteful language is a useful set of first principles in a
media environment that has never seen itself as a conduit of unbiased
information. Shifting discourse away from the ethnically charged rhetoric
which has so infamously characterized the region in recent years is a crucial
first step in the creation of a democratic press. On this basis, a foundation can
235. This connection has also been made in the experience of other countries with hate speech
regulation. As Michael Banton notes, when the British Home Secretary announced the 1968 Race
Relations Act, he stated that he "attached great importance to the declaratory nature of the provisions
against discrimination. The bill was to protect society; it was for the whole nation and not just for
minority groups." Michael Banton, The Declaratory Value of Laws Against Racial Incitement, in
STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 221, at 352.
236. Roger Errera, In Defense of Civility: Racial Incitement and Group Libel in French Law, in
STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 221, at 157.
237. WOLFSFELD, supra note 49, at 32.
238. Eric Niesser, Hate Speech in the New South Africa: Constitutional Considerations for a
Land Recovering from Decades of Racial Repression and Violence, 5 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 103,
129-30 (1994).
239. Robert Hislope has more thoroughly explored tolerant and inclusive dominant group
approaches to minorities and their importance during regime transitions. See, e.g., Robert Hislope,
Ethnic Conflict and the "Generosity Moment", 9 J. DEMOCRACY 140, 141 (1998).
240. OSCE, Training to Start for Journalists in Kosovo, at http://www.osce.org/pressrel/2000/
03/167-mik.html (Mar. 31, 2000), and OSCE Sponsors Journalists' Code of Conduct Conference, supra
note 98.
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be laid for a fourth estate capable of informing the Kosovars of diverse
viewpoints and safeguarding their expanding democracy from hate and
excesses.
VI. TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE MODEL OF HATE SPEECH
REGULATION IN Kosovo
If hate speech regulation represents a first step toward an independent
press and a more tolerant post-conflict society, as has been argued above, how
can this regulation best be made operational to service the goals of responsible
media and successful democratization? A final survey of the procedural
structure of the UNMIK Regulations provides us with an opportunity to
consider these issues within a practical framework.
While the control of hate speech and the provision of unbiased
information are important parts of post-conflict media reform, they comprise
but one facet of a democratic press. As I have discussed above, a truly
independent press is crucial to the protection of democratic rights and
freedoms. At present, the UNMIK Regulations create a system of media
regulation that is wholly in the hands of the international community currently
responsible for interim administration in the province.241 As discussed above,
the Temporary Media Commissioner is appointed by the Special
Representative to the Secretary-General and is charged with enforcing
regulations promulgated by the Special Representative. At the same time, the
regulations that have created this office contain no safeguards to protect the
independence of the office or parameters to define the role of the
Commissioner.242 Various non-governmental organizations have expressed
concern that the fact that the media regulations are drawn up and enforced by
the same body sets a dangerous precedent for media independence in the long
term in Kosovo. These organizations call for an independent court system to
adjudicate alleged violations of the regulations in order to prevent any future
co-opting of incitement proceedings by government elites for political
purposes.243 While this is a worthy goal, it is clear from many reports that the
Kosovar judiciary is not yet ready for this responsibility.2" To ensure
241. The Codes of Conduct discussed supra Section I.D are to remain in force only until
January 1, 2001 and are renewable only at the option of UNMIK for another ninety days. Free B-92
News, Kouchner Signs Codex on Media Behavior, at http://news.freeb92.net (Sept. 19, 2000).
Regulations 2000/36 and 2000/37, however, are to remain in effect "until there is effective self-
regulation of the print media." OSCE, Broadcast and Print Regulations for Kosovo Media Approved, at
http:llwww.osce.orglpress-rel2000/06/813-mik.html (June 21, 2000).
242. Elections in Kosovo, supra note 87.
243. E.g., Press Now, U.N. Setting 'Dangerous Precedent' With Kosovo Media Regulation, at
http:llwwv.dds.nlI-pressnow/media/kosovo/000630.html (June 30, 2000).
244. As noted above, the judicial system in Kosovo was in a state of destruction at the end of
the conflict. Fred Abrahams, The Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Justice Delayed in Kosovo, at
http://www.iwpr.netindex.pl5?balkansindex.html (Nov. 26, 1999); Maliqi, supra note 12; OSCE,
Review of the Criminal Justice System, at http:/lwww.osce.org/kosovo/publications/lawlcjustice.pdf
(Oct. 30, 2000). Responding to criticism regarding UNMIK's predominant role in press regulation,
D2ok Kovid, the Deputy Special Representative in Charge of Democratic Institutions in Kosovo, has
stated that "if such [judicial] institutions existed here [in Kosovo], then we would not be needed."
Bardhi, supra note S4. According to one OSCE source, the Albanian judges recently reinstalled in
Kosovar courts are inexperienced in international human rights law; there have also been charges of
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independent and fair disciplinary proceedings in the immediate term, the
office of the Temporary Media Commissioner has established an independent
administrative panel to rule on violations of media regulations.245 In the longer
term, once the judiciary has been fully staffed and judges and prosecutors
have been trained, the adjudication of incitement cases should be turned over
to the courts. The creation of an independent judiciary is of paramount
importance to the enforcement of this regulation and other laws currently
being promulgated in the province, especially in the wake of the elite-
sponsored chauvinism that was long endemic in Kosovar society
2 46
In addition, the regulations and their purposes must be considered within
the context of the current state of affairs in Kosovo. While a strong rule
against hate speech serves as an important organizing principle for a diverse
post-war polity, the over-enforcement of the regulation could inhibit the
creation of a truly open press capable of informing, mobilizing and protecting
a burgeoning democracy.247
First of all, it is crucial that the standards of liability are clear from the
outset. The regulation currently calls for the sanctioning of the broadcasting of
"personal details of any person.., if the broadcast of such details would pose
a serious threat to the life, safety or security of such person through vigilante
violence or otherwise." 248 This standard, as well as the standards imposed on
the media by the UNMIK Codes of Conduct for the Print and Broadcast
249 b sdtMedia, may be used to sanction much in the Kosovar media that falls short
of incitement to violence and ethnic enmity. The standards of liability in the
UNMIK regulations must be tightened in order to focus on media activity
related directly to public incitement to violence, 250 in order to avoid
misapplication of the regulation and the concurrent devaluation of the
declaratory power of its norms.
bias. Ann Garrels, Kosovo Elections (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 28, 2000), at http://news.
npr.org. Though some international judges and prosecutors have been appointed to positions in Kosovo,
many positions remain unfilled. Id.
245. The panel, called the Media Hearings Board, will consist of three members, one
international and two Kosovars. The Association of Kosovo Journalists, the Kosovo Law Center, and the
international community in Kosovo were invited to submit nominations for board membership. OSCE,
Rules and Procedures Established for Kosovo Media, at http:llwwwv.osce.orglpress-rel2000/11/1240-
mik.html (Nov. 7,2000).
246. For an engaging treatment of the role of an independent judiciary in post-conflict
societies, see Ran Hirschl, The Struggle for Hegemony: Understanding Judicial Empowerment through
Constitutionalization in Culturally Divided Societies, 36 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 73 (2000).
247. Andras Sajo has noted a similar conundrum in the Hungarian experience with hate speech
regulation, and writes that "[u]nrestrained speech.... given the social and political conflicts racking
Hungarian society during the transition period, may endanger social stability. Restricted speech, on the
other hand, may immobilize nascent civil society, limit fundamental freedoms, and stifle the lively
criticism of government so essential to democracy." Andras Sajo, Hate Speech for Hostile Hungarians,
3 E. EUR. CONsT. REV. 82, 82 (1994).
248. Regulation 2000/36, supra note 104.
249. See supra text accompanying note 109.
250. For example, an earlier incitement regulation proposed by UNMIK, Regulation 2000/4,
contained a more carefully worded standard than the current UNMIK regulations: it prohibited public
incitement to hatred between "national, racial, religious, ethnic, or other such groups living within
Kosovo." United Nations Mission in Kosovo, Regulation No. 2000/4 On the Prohibition Against
Inciting to National, Racial, Religious or Ethnic Hatred, Discord or Intolerance (entered into force Feb.
1, 2000), at http:/lwww.un.orglpeace/kosovolpages/regulations/reg04.html [hereinafter Regulation
2000/4].
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Secondly, some balancing of the interests of equality and free speech is
warranted if a truly multifaceted press is to be achieved. Germany's stringent
protection of equality interests is one means of striking a balance, but other
models may be better suited to the task of laying a framework for a robust
press that furthers the growth of a successful democracy.
As in the German model, the right of free expression granted by the
European Convention on Human Rights251 is not an absolute right; it is
circumscribed by eleven permissible exceptions.252 Unlike the German model,
however, the institutions of the European Convention 253 have considered
restrictions to the right of free expression under Article 10 of the European
Convention not only within the context of the purpose of the restriction on
speech, but also the proportionality of the restriction imposed. In considering
cases submitted to the European Court of Human Rights, the Commission
considers the merits of the case to determine "whether actions taken by the
state were prescribed by the law, whether they were necessary in a democratic
society, and whether the measures were proportionate to the aim pursued.
' 254
Thus, while the Convention institutions have upheld convictions for hate
speech where they have found that the public interest in the prevention of
crime and the protection of group reputation outweighed individual free
expression interests, 255 they have also interpreted the Convention to bar a
251. See generally Defeis, supra note 159, at 94-107 (describing the process by which the
European Convention was drafted within the Council of Europe between 1949 and 1950 to guarantee
human rights protections in its member states).
252. Article 10 of the European Convention guarantees the right to free expression. It is limited
by the restrictions contained in Article 10(2), which provides:
[The exercise of the right] may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions, or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the
interests of national security, territorial integrity, or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10(2),
213 U.N.T.S. 222. 230 [hereinafter European Convention].
253. See generally Defeis, supra note 159, at 94-107 (describing how the European Convention
established two institutions to ensure compliance with its norms: the European Commission of Human
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights). The Commission, however, was abolished at the end
of 1998.
254. Id. at 104. Douglas-Scott maintains:
If R.A. V v. St. Paul had fallen under the jurisdiction of the European Court, that court
would have had to scrutinize closely the state legislature's motive in passing the
ordinance, which was to prevent aggressive behavior of a certain sort, targeted at certain
groups. The main focus of such an inquiry, then, would require the court to consider
whether the state's action was necessary in response to "a pressing social need" and in
proportion to its objective.
Douglas-Scott, supra note 141, at 328-29.
255. Douglas-Scott, supra note 141, at 329-30 (citing D.I. v. Germany, App. No. 26551/95,
Eur. Comm'n H.R. (June 26, 1996) at http://wwv.echr.coe.int/hudoe). Irving had been convicted in
Germany under sections 185, 189 and 194 of the German Penal Code after claiming that the gas
chambers at Auschwitz were fakes and had been constructed after the Second World War. The
Commission, in rejecting Irving's application, held that the conviction had been necessary in a
democratic society under Article 10(2) of the ECHR and that the public interest in the prevention of
crime and disorder in German society due to insulting behavior against Jewish citizens, as well as the
requirements of protecting their reputation and rights, outweighed Irving's freedom to deny the
existence of the gas chambers. Id.
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conviction for the mere broadcasting of an interview with racists.256 The
balancing of interests exhibited by the Convention institutions may better
accomplish the dual objective of safeguarding equality and expression. The
application of similar standards for liability in cases under the UNMIK
Regulations can provide a flexibility that would permit the loosening of
restrictions on speech as Kosovar society stabilizes and matures.
Finally, there remains the question of long-term enforcement of the
regulation. Though the UNMIK Regulations are intended only as interim
ordinances, the present situation on the ground in Kosovo makes clear that
hate speech regulation should be a part of the new body of law being drafted
for the province. As the experiences of Germany and Yugoslavia make clear,
the unregulated marketplace that characterizes the American approach to free
speech may be altogether inappropriate within a society trying to rebuild in
the wake of mutual enmity and atrocity. If the goal of transition is
reconciliation and democratization, the regulation of hate speech can manifest
a commitment to tolerance and equality around which a new, inclusive
democracy can be organized. More directly, decoupling nationality and
politics is crucial to the growth of an independent press capable of informing,
mobilizing, and challenging a burgeoning democracy.
256. Jersild v. Denmark, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1995). Jersild, a Danish journalist, was found
guilty of aiding and abetting the dissemination of racist remarks by broadcasting an interview with a
Danish skinhead group who expounded on their racist beliefs. The Commission found that while the
statements made by the group were highly offensive, the manner in which they were presented by Jersild
was sufficient to outweigh the effect on the reputation or rights of others, thus the interference with free
expression interests was not proportionate to the aim pursued. Therefore, the interference could not be
considered "necessary in a democratic society" and Article Ten had been breached. Id. at 18.
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